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1. IN'TR.ODUCTION

I voted for AI Gore. Although I was not an enthusiastic
supponer, I thought that he was better than the available
alternatives. I was sorry to see him lose.
On the simplest level, then, what's bad about Bush v. Gore1 is
that it put in place an administration that is bad for the
country-indeed, disastrously bad in my view. Of course, this is not
what people usually mean when they claim that the case was
wrongly decided. But it turns out that it is harder than one might
suppose to figure out what else is bad about Bush v. Gore.
tprofessor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., 1968,
University of Chicago;J.D., 1971, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Michael
Klarman, Mark Tushnet, Peter Rubin, Neal Katyal, Barry Friedman, Frank
Michelman, Pamela Karlan, Daniel Farber, and Steven Goldberg, for their
comments on an earlier draft. Roshini Thayaparan provided tireless and
exceedingly helpful research assistance.
1.531 U.S. 98 (2000).

953

HeinOnline -- 47 Wayne L. Rev. 953 2001-2002

954

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:953

The problem is thrown into sharp relief by focusing on an
embarrassing and obvious, if too little remarked upon, feature of
the election debacle. Almost without exception, Bush supporters
think that the decision was not bad at all. They believe that the
recount procedures authorized by the Florida Supreme Court were
unfair and illegal and that the United States Supreme Court's
decision halting the recount was wise.2 Gore supporters, on the
2. For a sampling of conservative legal academics who expressed this view,
see Nelson Lund, An Act ofCourage, THE WEEKLY STANDARD at 19 (DEC. 25,
2000) (arguing that "Rather than take the easy way out, [the majority]
courageously accepted their 'unsought responsibility' to require that the Florida
court comply with the Constitutionj; CHARLES FRIED, AN UNREASONABLE
REACTION TO AREASONABLE DECISION IN BUSHV. GoRE: THE QUESTION OF
LEGITIMACY (Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 2001) (forthcoming) [hereinafter
Legitimacy] (arguing that case was correctly decided, although reasonable people
might differ about its correctness); Gary C. Leedes, The Presidential Election Case:
Remembering Safe Harbor Day, 35 U. RICH. L. REv. 237,245 (2001) (calling the
majority opinion "a fair and balanced assessment of the applicable law"); Richard
A. Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature ThereofMay Direct": The Outcome
in Bush v. GoreDefended, 68 U. CHI. L. REv: 613, 634 (2001) (arguing that "there
is ample reason to believe ... that the Florida Supreme Court adopted, under the
guise of interpretation, a scheme for conducting election challenges that deviates
markedly from that which the Florida legislature had set out in its statutes");
Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon to an Assessment, 68 U. CHI. L.
REv. 719, 719 (2001) (arguing that there was "no basis in Florida law" for a
recount); John C. Yoo, In Defense ofthe Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REv.
775, 776 (2001) ("Rather than acting hypocritically and lawlessly, the Court's
decision to bring the Florida election dispute to a timely, and fmal, end not only
restored stability to the political system but was also consistent with the
institutional role the Court has shaped for itself over the last decade."). For some
admirable, if partial, counterexamples of conservative scholars who expressed
reservations about the decision, see Steven G. Calabresi, A Political Question
(forthcoming) (arguing that the Supreme Court correctly decided the merits, but
that the Court should have found that the case posed a political question);
Michael W. McConnell, Two·and.a·HalfCheers for Bush v. Gore, 63 U.CHI. L.
REv. 657, 660 (2001) {arguing that the Court's "Fourteenth Amendment holding
.•. was both sensible and persuasive," but that "the decision to halt the recount
was incorrect as a matter of law (though the question is closer than the Court's
critics like to think.)").
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other hand, are similarly unanimous in believing that the Florida
recount was eminently justified and that the Supreme Court's
decision was an outrage.3
Yet the actual issues in dispute, as opposed to the upshot of
their resolution, had no obvious ideological valence.4 There is no
priori reason why Republicans should in general oppose manual
recounts, while Democrats should in general favor them. The
3. For liberal academics taking this view, see Michael Klarman, Bush v. Gore
Through the Lens o/Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1721, 1725 (2001)
("[T]he Bush outcome was a product of . . . partisan political preference for
George W. Bush, which ... may have been enhanced by [a] desire to retire from
the court while a Republican President is in office ....); Jed Rubenfeld, Not as
Bad as Plessy. Worse, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2 (forthcoming) ("The
breathtaking indefensibility of Bush v. Gore is of an order different from the deep
ideological clashes surrounding cases like Plessy and Roe."); Owen Fiss, The
Fallibility o/Reason, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2 (forthcoming) ("[The Court's]
equal protection holding has no constitutional warrant."); Margaret Jane Radin,
Can the Rule 0/ lAw Survive Bush v. Gore?, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2
(forthcoming) ("instead of deciding the case in accordance with pre-existing legal
principles, fairly interpreted or even stretched if need be, five Republican
members of the Court decided the case in a way that is recognizably nothing
more than a naked expression of these justices' preference for the Republican
Party"); David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI.
L. REv. 737, 737 (2001) ("[S]everal members of the Court-perhaps a
majority-weredetennined to overturn any ruling of the Florida Supreme Court
that was favorable to Vice President Gore, at least if that ruling significantly
enhanced the Vice President's chances of winning the election."); Jack M. Balkin,
Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between lAw and Politics, 110 YALEL.J. 1407,
1434 (2001) ("There simply was no lawless court for the U.S. Supreme Court to
counteract, just a court that construed its own local law in a way that five
Justices did not like."); Cass R. Sunstein, Order without lAw, 68 U. CHI. L. REv.
757,758 (2001) ("[T]he Court's rationale was not only exceedingly ambitious but
also embarrassingly weak."). For a notable counterexample of a liberal who
argued for a legal outcome that would not have favored Gore, see Neal Katyal,
Florida's Election Day Vote Could Be Irrelevant, FindLaw's Legal Commentary,
< http://writ.news.findlaw.comlcommentary/20001109Jtatyal.html > (visited
Nov. 5, 2001) (arguing that "the Constitution and Congress ... have given the
Florida legislature the task of redressing problems in this hotly-contested
election.").
4. I argue below that the decision in fact has a political valence which is
somewhat less than obvious. See infra pp. 1013-18.
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difference between "hanging" and "pregnant" chads does not
connect in any straightforward way with the great issues of our
time that divide liberals from conservatives. Indeed, partisans on
both sides were required to reverse some of their more accustomed
positions-with regard to federalism concerns, judicial "activism,"
and the scope of equal protection review, for example-in order to
reach the outcomes that coincided with political advantage. 5
Advocates of "neutral principles" often decry the willingness of
judges to sacrifice legal for ideological virtue. The argument
surrounding the 2000 election indicates that things may be much
worse than these advocates suppose. The election debacle suggests
an inability to maintain even ideological consistency. Moreover,
this contagion of ideological malleability extended far beyond the
realm of official advocates and spokespeople for both sides, where
tendentious argument is widely assumed to be a distasteful but
necessary professional obligation. It also claimed virtually all of the
politicians and media commentators who debated the matter
endlessly on television and Op Ed pages. Perhaps more
surprisingly, many "talking heads" from the academy, who often
present themselves as above partisan bickering, were infected.
There are some who believe that the malady tainted the decisions
of the Florida Supreme Court, whose Democratic majority handed
Gore his greatest victories. And, as I shall argue in some detail
below, the United States Supreme Court itself fell victim when its
contentious five-four decision, precisely tracking the Court's
liberal-conservative fault line, made George W. Bush the President
of the United States.
What are we to make of this much-ignored elephant-or should
I say donkey?-in the parlor? Are we to think it no more than an
astounding coincidence that through disinterested ratiocination,
liberals came to one set of conclusions that happened to meet their
5. See Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REv.
679,683 (2001) (arguing that "[t]aking one by one the issues oflaw that crucially
divided the majority from the dissenters in Bush v. Gore, it seems that ideological
alignment either doesn't predict the vote at all or that it predicts the opposite of
the votes cast by conservatives").
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political needs, while conservatives came to another set of
conclusions that happened to meet theirs? I, for one, am not quite
cynical enough to think that all the participants in the debates and
judicial decisions surrounding the election consciously misstated
their true beliefs for the sake of political advantage. But neither am
I ingenuous enough to take seriously the "mere coincidence"
explanation. Eliminating these possibilities leaves us with the
disturbing hypothesis that many of our beliefs-including those
expressed in this essay-are the unconscious product of something
other than the reasoned arguments offered on their behalf. 6 If this
hypothesis is correct, then our very lack of consciousness about the
process, as well as our ability to mask our predispositions with
reasoned argument, raises disturbing questions about theories of
deliberative democracy/
In this essay, I respond to these worries with the
counterintuitive suggestion that unconsciously tendentious
constitutional argument has the potential to facilitate deliberation.
In order to make sense of this claim, we need to understand
something about the fantasy world inhabited by many academic
constitutional theorists and about what happened to that world on
the evening of December 12, 2000.
6. See Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain
Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 923, 947 (2001):
Undoubtedly, no academic saw him or herself as claiming the academic
bully pulpit or trading on academic credentials for purely partisan aims.
But as psychological studies going back several decades have shown,
partisans of different camps will integrate identical information in
clearly divergent ways. All too often identical information is analyzed
in distinctly self-interested ways by parties claiming in good faith to be
examining the situation objectively. Anyone too busy to read this
literature need only think about the racially polarized views of the O.J.
Simpson case or, for that matter, about how throughout the Florida
controversy, in viewing identical events, Republicans and Democrats
were each convinced that partisans of the other party were trying to
steal the election.

Id.
7. For a useful discussion, see Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind:
Transmutation andMisrepresentation, 3 LEGAL THEORY 133 (1997).
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Perhaps it reveals an unfortunate parochialism to focus on the
difficulties of legal academics who specialize in constitutional law.
Still, their confusion is of some importance because they articulate
the "Official Story" of .constitutionalism. Even if, as I shall argue
below, that story bears little relationship to reality, it is nonetheless
of some moment when the story begins to fall apart.
According to the Official Story, constitutional law settles
otherwise destabilizing political disputes through reference to a
meta-agreement. People disagree about ordinary things, but they
agree (or at least ought to agree) about the big things. This
agreement, whether embodied in the constitutional text, or in
doctrine and tradition that has glossed it, prevents the community
from coming unraveled. Sometimes the agreement is substantive, as
for example, when the Constitution directly prohibits certain
outcomes like laws depriving people of property without just
compensation. More often it is procedural, as when the
Constitution allocates decision making authority to a branch of the
federal government, the states, or the private sphere. Whatever its
source, we are supposedly able to reach political settlements by
reasoning back down from the meta-agreement so as to settle
contested political issues.
For this story to make sense, four preconditions must be
satisfied. First, there must be agreement on the metalevel. Second,
there must be a discourse capable of mediating between the
contested political level and the uncontroversial metalevel. Third,
there must be an institution capable of engaging in the discourse.
And finally, the institution and the discourse it utilizes must be
"neutral" in the sense that they must not themselves be caught up
in the very political controversy that they are supposed to settle.
Conventionally, it is thought that the Constitution provides the
area of agreement, that an arcane and specialized form of
reasoning-legal reasoning-provides the mediating discourse, that
the Supreme Court is uniquely capable of engaging in this
discourse, and that both the Court and the discourse are free from
political entanglements. Hence, the widely held view, apparently
shared by at least some of the Justices, that only the Supreme Court
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could settle our unsettled election. Hence, the belief that the
Court's legitimacy rests upon its use of legal reasoning that is
neutral and apolitical. And hence the crisis of conscience when the
Court rendered a decision that struck many as unreasoned and
blatantly political.8
Not surprisingly, people whose professional lives are invested
in the truth of the Official Story have reacted defensively to this
assault upon it. The defensive maneuvers fall into three broad
categories. First, a few brave souls (almost invariably conservatives
and Bush supporters) have undertaken the unenviable task of
attempting to demonstrate the legal respectability of the decision.9
Second, others (mostly moderate Gore supporters) have been
skeptical or agnostic about the decision itself, but have nonetheless
taken its reasoning seriously. These commentators have suggested
interesting avenues of future doctrinal development that the
decision supposedly opens.10 Third, the vast majority of academics
(almost invariably liberals and Gore supporters) have reacted with
fury at the decision. ll They claim. that it is grossly political and that
it therefore foolishly and needlessly squanders the Court's
credibility which, as noted above, rests on its apolitical neutrality. 12
Each of these views is profoundly mistaken. Part One of this
8. See Balkin, supra note 3, at 1407 ("It is no secret that the Supreme Court's
decision ... has shaken the faith of many legal academics in the Supreme Court
and in the system of judicial review."). Id. at 1408-09 n.3 (citing sources).
9. See sources supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, The Court's Legacy for Voting Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A39 (arguing that the greater import of this case may be
a surprising expansion of voting rights); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 758 (arguing
that "[o]n its face, [the Court's] holding has the potential to create the most
expansive, and perhaps sensible, protection for voting rights since the Court's
one-person, one-vote decisions of mid-century").
11. Shortly after the decision, 673 law professors from 137 law schools
signed a statement accusing the Court of "suppress[ing] the facts and performing
the job of propagandists, not judges." N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,2001, at A7. For an
account of how the statement came about, see Radin, supra note 3 ("The
statement was circulated rather haphazardly through email by an accidental
activist (me) pushed over the edge by a sense of outrage.").
12. See supra note 3.
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essay explains why. The Court's decision does not pass the "straight
face" test when judged according to the aspirations for legal analysis
required to make the Official Story plausible. There is no reason to
take the decision seriously, and it portends precisely nothing with
regard to future doctrinal developments. But it is also wrong to
condemn the decision because it is political. There simply was no
neutral, apolitical way in which the case could have been decided,
as the dissenting justices themselves unwittingly demonstrate.
Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the Court has
squandered its credibility or that the community is about to come
unstuck because the Court's partisanship has been unmasked. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens lamented the fact that the
decision "lend[s] credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work
of judges throughout the land."n Similarly, Justice Breyer darkly
warned of a "self-inflicted wound" that might "harm not just the
Court, but the Nation. ,,14 Yet despite these dire predictions, life
seems to have gone on pretty much as before. In the wake of the
Court's decision, there were no tanks in the streets, no raging mobs
at the barricades. Public opinion polls suggested that, even though
many people (correctly) understood that Bush v. Gore was
political,15 the Court paid no price for the decision and may have
even benefitted from it. 16
13. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14.Id. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15. For example, a Gallup poll in the immediate wake of the election found
that 51% of those polled agreed with the statement that the U.S. Supreme Court
justices were influenced by their personal political views when deciding the case.
See Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Willing to Accept Supreme Court as FinalArbiter 0/
Election Dispute, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 12, 2000, at
< http://www.gallup.comipolllreleases/pr001212.asp > (visited Nov. 5, 2001).
A Newsweek poll conducted by Princeton Research Associates found that 65%
of those surveyed thought that politics or partisanship played a major role er
somewhat of a role in the Court's decision. See
< http://www.pollingreport.comlwh2post.htm > (visited Nov. 5, 2001).
16. A variety of polls found that the Court's standing with the American
public changed little after its decision. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Laying Down the
Law, Justices Ruled with Confidence, WASH. POST, July 1, 2001, at A6 (finding
that [p]ublic approval of the Supreme Court, as measured by polls, was not
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All of which suggests that what's gone bad is not the Supreme
Court, but instead the Official Story. How is it that the Supreme
Court was able to play this role once stripped of the protective
covering of legality that mainstream academics have insisted is
essential to its legitimacy?
Three possibilities suggest themselves. First, the Court may
have prevailed through deception. Perhaps the decision is parasitic
on the reputation for legality or integrity that the Court has built
up over the years or on the pseudo-religious imagery that it uses to
obscure its exercise of power. I do not discount this possibility. The
Court's decision had the external trappings of legality, even though
it lacked the requisite substance. If people were fooled by these
trappings, and if the Court emerges from Bush v. Gore confident in
its ability to fool, then the decision will have been an unmitigated
disaster.
But it is far too soon to assume that the Court has in fact been
successful. Polling data suggests that it did not escape the attention .
of the American people that the five most conservative justices
dented by the election case and that 72% of those polled expressed a favorable
view of the Court); Jeffrey M. Jones, Opinion o/U.S. Supreme Court Has Become
More Politicized, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 3, 2001, at
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/prOl0103b.asp > (visited Nov. 5, 2001)
(fmding that after election 49% of Americans had "either a great deal or quite a
lot" of confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court, compared with 47% in a poll
taken before the election). Most Americans seem to have been grateful to the
Court for ending the controversy. See, e.g., David W. Moore, Eight in Ten
Americans to AcceptBush as "Legitimate"President, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Dec.
14, 2000, at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr001214.asp> (visited
Nov. 5,2001) (fmding that 52% of those surveyed agreed with the Court's
decision to stop the recount). On the other hand, there is some evidence that the
overall statistics mask an increased political polarization about the Court. See,
e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Into the Election Waters: The Impact ofBush v. Gore on
Public Perceptions andKnowledgeo/the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32 (2001)
(fmding that the overall approval of the Court may have been unchanged because
of cross-cutting shifts, with those approving of the Court's decision increasing
their support and those disapproving the decision decreasing their support;
Jones, supra (finding that "surface stability [concerning American's opinions
about the Supreme Court] masked significant change in the way Republicans and
Democrats view [the Court]").
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favored the outcome, while their four more liberal colleagues
opposed it. 17 H there was any deception at all, it was likely a kind
of self-deception-a willful overlooking of facts that were there for
all to see.
A second possibility is that the Supreme Court provided a
useful focal point even though its decision was correctly perceived
to be partisan rather than legal. Although the country was sharply
divided about the election's outcome, there was near unanimity in
the desire to get the matter over with. 18 Even if the Supreme Court
was acting nonlegally, it was at least able to settle the issue in a
peaceful and orderly fashion.
The trouble with this account is that it fails to explain why
people were prepared to endorse settlement by the Supreme Court,
rather than another institution. After all, the federal judiciary was
not the only possible focal point. The 2000 election might have
been settled by the Florida Supreme Court, by the Florida
Legislature, or, most plausibly, by the United States Congress. 19 Yet
17. See supra note 15.
18. Within a week of the Court's decision, eight in ten Americans were
saying that they accepted Bush as the legitimate President. See Moore, supra note
16, at <httpllwww.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr001214.asp>. The same poll
showed that although 42% of Americans agreed with the Supreme Court's
decision, 66% said that the decision had no effect on their view of the court. Id
19. Some commentators have asserted that if the Court had not intervened,
the controversy would have spun out of control. See Richard A. Posner, Florida
2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing
Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REv. 1,45-46 (2000). Cj Sunstein, supra note 3, at 769
(speculating that a genuine constitutional crisis might have arisen and that
although "the nation would have survived, •.. things would have gotten very
messy"}.Id. Of course, there is no way to be certain what would have happened,
but I believe these claims are hyperbolic. The disputed election of 1800 was
resolved without judicial intervention even though the country, at that point,
had no precedent for a peaceful transfer of power from one party to another and
the outgoing administration had incarcerated many of its political opponents.
Similarly, the election of 1876 was settled peaceably although the country was
still sharply divided by the Civil War, which had ended only eleven years earlier.
No doubt, a congressional struggle over the presidency in these calmer times
would nonetheless have been bitter and divisive, but I have little doubt that it
eventually would have been resolved without resort to force.
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for reasons that the Official Story leaves entirely mysterious, the
country seemed quite satisfied-indeed, grateful-that nine
unelected, politically motivated justices in Washington D.C. settled
the matter.
In Part Two of this essay, I explore a third possibility-one that
turns the Official Story inside out. There is a chance that Bush v.
Gore may begin a process of laying a more attractive and realistic
foundation for constitutionalism than the Official Story provides.
The very fact that the CoUrt is not politically independent and that
it could not settle the matter in a disinterested, apolitical fashion
might set us down a path toward a more mature version of
constitutional law. The politically tendentious character of the
Coon's reasoning demonstrates that our core constitutional
commitments are subject to political manipulation. Ironically,
public understanding of this malleability makes our politics more,
rather than less, inclusive. It does so by suggesting that
constitutional law, properly understood, does not settle disputes by
ruling cenain substantive positions out-of-bounds. Thus, losers in
our political disputes need not believe that they are outside the
boundaries of respectable argument, defined by an exclusionary
constitution. Instead, they may come to understand that they too
can utilize the magnificently empty rhetoric of constitutional law
to achieve their ends. The upshot is continuing and unresolved
struggle over the meaning of American democracy. It is this
possibility of struggle, rather than a legally definitive resolution,
that encourages people with incompatible political views to remain
in an ongoing and peaceful dialogue with each other.20

20. For a more general defense of the theoretical position I articulate here,
see LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETILED CONSmunON: A NEW
ARGUMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAlJSMANDJUDICIAL REVIEW (2001). This essay
is intended as a case study, applying the position I defend in my book-length
treatment to a particularly interesting set of facts.
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II. THE DECISION

A. Prologue: How the Supreme Court Ran Out the Clock
Any serious discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Bush
v. Gore must begin by facing a difficult dilemma. Even the most
vigorous attack on the Court's reasoning serves in some measure to
normalize the decision. Such an attack implicitly assumes that the
Coun advanced its reasons in good faith and that its reasoning
merits a good faith response. But there is little reason for affording
the Coun the benefit of this presumption. Any effon to engage
with the opinion therefore takes it more seriously than it deserves
to be taken. The best evidence for the Court's lack of seriousness
derives from its apparently intentional effort to create the very
problems that it chastised the state court for failing to resolve. To
see how the justices laid a trap for the hapless and unwitting Florida
coun, we must examine the procedural and temporal context for its
holding.
The majority handed George W. Bush the presidency by relying
upon the interaction of two legal arguments. First, the Court held
that a state wide, manual recount administered under a broad
standard requiring discernment of the "intent of the voter" would
lead to "arbitrary and disparate" treatment in violation of the equal
protection c1ause.21 Standing alone, this holding might have
required no more than a remand to the Florida Supreme Coun for
it to fashion uniform sub standards to guide decisionmaking. The
Coun's second holding prevented this outcome. In two short
paragraphs at the conclusion of its opinion, the Coun found that
the Florida Supreme Coun had said that the Florida legislature
intended the state's election laws to mandate compliance with the
"safe harbor" provision contained in 3 U.S.C. § 5.22 This provision,23 in tum, had the effect of establishing a December 12
21. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,105 (2000).
22. See id. at 110-11.
23. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) which provides as follows:
If any State shall have provided ... for its final determination of any
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deadline for the recount's completion.24 By the time the Court
rendered its decision, this deadline was only hours away. Because
"any recount seeking to meet [this deadline would] be
unconstitutional,,,25 the Court reversed the judgment ordering the
recount to proceed.
Assuming a December 12 deadline existed and that a more
specific, uniform standard was constitutionally mandated, then the
Court correctly held that a recount was impossible by the time it
rendered its decision. I challenge these assumptions below.
However, even if they are accepted, we need to reckon with the
Court's own responsibility for this unfortunate state of affairs. The
Florida Court might have fashioned a uniform standard for a
manual recount when ample time still remained to complete the
tabulation. However, the state court failed to do so for three
reasons, each of which can be laid at the doorstep of the United
States Supreme Court.26
First, it is important to understand that the Court's initial
controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the
electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures, and
such determination shall have been made at least six days before the
time fIxed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made
pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made six days prior to
said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern
in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution,
and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors
appointed by such State is concerned.
24. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 110. December 18 had been established as the date
for counting the electoral votes; December 12 had been established for taking
advantage of this provision.
25.1d.
26. It must be noted that a fourth reason is attributable to the Florida
Supreme Court. Had the Florida Supreme Court not extended the protest phase
in its fIrst decision, (see Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1226 (pIa. 2000», there would have been more time to complete the contest
phase. In light of the Florida Supreme Court's subsequent decision mandating
de novo review of the "protest" result, (see Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (pIa.
2000», its decision extending this phase, in the teeth of clear statutory language
establishing a deadline for completion, is difficult to defend. But see infra note
115.
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encounter with the equal protection argument came eight days
before its ultimate decision. At an earlier stage in the process, the
Florida Supreme Court had extended the deadline for completion
of the "protest" phase of the recount,27 and canvassing boards were
busily recounting ballots pursuant to this order. George W. Bush
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court challenging this decision. 28 In his petition, Bush raised three
issues for review. The first two concerned the legality of the state
court's extension of the statutory deadline for completing the
"protest" phase.29 Bush argued that this decision constituted a
judicial rewriting of Florida's statutory scheme, thereby violating
the Article II requirement that the method for choosing electors be
determined by the state legislature.3o Moreover, Bush contended
that the Florida Court's interpretation of its election laws violated
3 U.S.C. § 5, which provided a "safe harbor" for states whose
electors were challenged only if the procedures for challenge were
in place before election day.31
Although both of these questions hold some abstract interest,
neither one had much importance by the time the Court decided
the case. The court-imposed deadline for the protest was fast
approaching and, whether or not the extension was lawful, it was
clear that the ultimate resolution of the election would come in the
"contest" phase. Nonetheless, to the surprise of many, the Court
addressed these questions.32
In contrast, the third question raised by the Bush petition
pertained to the upcoming" contest" phase as well as the soon-to-be
completed "protest" phase. Bush asked the Court to decide
27. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1235
(PIa. 2000).

28. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220,
petitionforcert.filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Nov. 24,2000) (No.00-836). The
petition can be found in the U.S. Supreme Court's Records & Briefs, Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., Petitionfor Writ o/Certiorari (No. 00-836).
29. See U.S. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, supra note 28, at i.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
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"Whether the use of arbitrary, standardless, and selective manual
recounts that threaten to overturn the results of the election for
President of the United States violates the Equal Protection or Due
Process Clauses or the First Amendment. "33 In this part of the
petition, Bush outlined many of the same complaints about the
absence of a uniform standard that the Court ultimately found
meritorious eight days later.34 But at the point when something
might actually have been done about the problem, the Court was
uninterested in the argument. Although the Court granted
certiorari to hear the two questions that barely mattered, it
conspicuously refused to grant certiorari to hear the third
question.35
In light of the determinate weight the Court ultimately gave to
this argument, its failure to grant review at this earlier stage is
troubling. To be sure, the intersection between facts and law was
not identical in the two cases. The equal protection problems posed
by a state wide recount were somewhat different from those posed
by recounts in selective counties. The fact remains, that, at the very
least, the underlying argument that the Court finally accepted
would also have brought into question the procedures Bush
challenged in his initial petition. If the Court had granted that
petition and dealt with these problems at an earlier stage, the
Florida Supreme Court could easily have imposed a uniform
standard and would have had ample time to complete the recount
during the contest phase.36
33. U.S. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, supra note 28, at i.
34. See id. at 21-23.
35. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 70, 104 (2000).
36. I do not mean to suggest that the Court deliberately delayed
consideration of this question so as to prevent the state supreme court from
correcting the problem before the putative December 12 deadline. Still, it is
troubling that the Court eventually found dispositive an argument that, a week
earlier, it had not even considered worthy of review. The most cynical view of
this chronology is that the Court latched onto an argument which the justices
themselves thought unworthy of serious consideration, in a desperate attempt
to find some ground on which to reverse the Florida court. A less cynical version
would attribute incompetence, rather than malevolence, to the justices. Even on
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Of course, even in the absence of a United States Supreme
Court holding, the Florida Supreme Court might have adopted a
uniform standard on its own. However, its failure to do so is also
directly attributable to the United States Supreme Court's earlier
actions. As already noted. in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board,37 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the Florida court had improperly modified the
statutory electoral scheme. Although it failed to resolve this
question definitively, the Court vacated the state court's judgment
and remanded the case with directions to the Florida court to
clarify the basis for its decision.38
This action strongly implied that if the state court had changed
the statutory scheme, the change would be unlawful. Not
surprisingly, then, the Florida court went to great lengths to show
that it had taken the h:int. In its opinion after the remand, it sought
to demonstrate that its original decision constituted no more than
an interpretation of an ambiguous statute.39 More to the point,
when the question arose as to the appropriate standard for
evaluating ballots during the contest phase, the Florida court was
careful to confine itself to the statutory language, which invoked
the general "intent of the voter" standard.40 Given what had come
before, the Florida court had good reason to fear that if it attempted
to articulate a more specific standard, the United States Supreme
Court would have found a violation of Article II. Having bent over
backward to avoid this problem, the state court found itself
chastised instead for its failure to embroider on the statutory
language so as to make it more specific.
Of course, it is theoretically possible that the constitutional
the less cynical view, however, the fact remains that had the Court thought more
clearly at the beginning of the process about which issues mattered and which
did not, the time problem that ultimately doomed the recount might never have
ansen.
37.531 U.S. 70 (2000).
38. See id. at 78.
39. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273,128289 (Fla. 2000).
40. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257, 1262 (Fla. 2000).
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problem that ultimately defeated the recount effort was created by
the Florida legislature, rather than the Florida court. One might
argue that the legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause when
it failed to articulate a more specific standard, and that Article IT left
the Florida court powerless to correct this defect. On this view, the
recount was doomed regardless of the state court's actions. The
trouble with this approach, though, is that it cannot be reconciled
with the United States Supreme Court's opinion. The Court did
not hold that the any recount conducted pursuant to the Florida
statutory scheme was necessarily illegal.41 Instead, it held that there
was insufficient time for the state court to formulate and implement
a more specific standard.42 Yet time ran out only because the very
justices who criticized the state court had discouraged it from
formulating such a standard when there was still time to implement
it.
There is still a third respect in which the Court's earlier actions
created the very problem that it found impossible to remedy. Time
ran out on the Florida recount in no small measure because the
United States Supreme Court itself decided to run out the clock.
With the state wide recount already underway and significant
progress being made, the Court, over a strong dissent by the four
justices who ultimately dissented from its judgment on the merits,
entered a stay that brought the recount to an abrupt halt. 43 No
further progress was made during the agonizing three days it took
the Court to hear argument and decide the case.
Had the recount been allowed to proceed while the matter was
under review, the difficulties that the Court ultimately discerned
might never have materialized. The circuit judge, charged by the
Florida Supreme Court with overseeing the recount, might have
resolved disputes under a uniform standard.44 Even if he failed to do
so, the canvassing boards conducting the recount might have
41. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 110.
42. Seeid.
43. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
44. The Florida court's remand order gave the circuit court sweeping powers
to administer the statewide recount. See Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1262.
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determined the number of ballots falling into various categories.
Had the United States Supreme Court at that point decided that a
uniform standard was constitutionally compelled, the state court
could simply have imposed the standard on the already counted
ballots.
The Supreme Court offered no reason for the entry of its stay,
and it is hard to imagine what threatened, irreparable injury could
have justified its action. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
offered two suggestions: The counting of votes, he claimed,
threatened irreparable injury "by casting a cloud upon what [Bush]
claims to be the legitimacy of his election, "45 and by "prevent[ing]
an accurate recount from being conducted on a proper basis later,
since it is generally agreed that each manual recount produces a
degradation of the ballots, which renders a subsequent recount
inaccurate. "46
If the full Court acted for the reasons Justice Scalia specified,
then its decision was plainly wrong. The" cloud" theory ignores the
obvious point that for irreparable injury to justify a stay, the injury
must stem from the legal wrongdoing alleged by the petitioner. But
at no stage in the litigation did anyone suggest a theory under
which the mere tabulation of ballots (as opposed to the celtification
of outcomes) violated the law. Thus, even if counting the ballots
threw doubt on the legitimacy of the election, and even if it were
appropriate for the Court to protect against public perceptions
brought about by illegal conduct, the Court plainly had no business
enjoining entirely legal conduct that might bring the election's
outcome into disrepute. To claim otherwise would be to suggest
that the Court should have intervened to stop Florida's cooperation
with the post-election efforts by various news organizations to
tabulate the ballots so that the public could judge for itself the
election's legitimacy.47
45. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1046.
46.Id.
47. Such a holding is implausible even if we put to one side the First
Amendment right of newspapers to conduct such a recount. Does anyone
suppose that, but for the First Amendment, the Constitution could be read to
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To be sure, there might have been a basis for Supreme Court
intervention if the putatively illegal recount endangered a
subsequent, legally required recount by" degrading" the ballots. But
there was never much chance of a subsequent recount. By
December 9, when it issued the stay, the Court must have known
that there would be no such recount prior to the supposed
December 12 deadline. Even if there were no deadline, a new
recount would not have been necessary so long as the circuit judge
had the opportunity to impose a uniform standard on the ballots
that had been categorized by the canvassing boards. And even if
there were a new recount, the extent to which ballot degradation
would have threatened its integrity is, at best, debatable. 48 Against
these speculative risks was the much more likely possibility (it
turned out to be a certainty) that the recount would be altogether
frustrated not by ballot degradation, but by the Court's own stay.
It is surely more than mere hindsight bias to recognize that this
second risk greatly outweighed the first. Indeed, Justice Stevens
contemporaneously predicted precisely this outcome in his dissent
from the granting of the stay.49

B. The Supreme Court's Frantic Search for a Constitutional Problem
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the Supreme Court's
own prior conduct manufactured whatever constitutional problem
it set about to resolve in its December 12 opinion. This fact, in
tum, creates the suspicion that the Court was engaged in an
elaborate game of "gotcha" with the Florida judiciary and
reenforces the belief that its ultimate rationale for ending the
recount should not be taken seriously. Still, backgroUnd rules of
civility in public debate require that we at least begin by presuming
the good faith of those with whom we disagree. In the next Part, I
will suggest that this requirement, applied to these facts, produces
prohibit newspapers from counting the ballots in Florida?
48. See, e.g.• CanvassingBoardSegregates 'Under Votes, 'MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
20, 2000 (debating whether recounting degrades ballots).
49. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 1046. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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a positive payoff. There is a way to understand the Court's conduct
as motivated by defensible concerns honestly held. First, however,
it is important to establish that the opinions the Justices in the
majority produced do nothing to advance that understanding. What
these opinions instead demonstrate is that despite the Court's own
best efforts to create a constitutional problem, when it finally
turned to the task of solving the problem, it found nothing that
plausibly required its intervention.
1. The Mythical Equal Protection Problem

The Court's per curiam opinion holds that the recount
procedure ordered by the Florida Supreme Court violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it did "not satisfy the minimum
requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to
secure the fundamental right [to vote].,,50 To be sure, the Florida
Supreme Court had mandated an "intent of the voter" test to judge
the validity of ballots.51 But while this test was "unobjectionable as
an abstract proposition and a starting principle," it was
constitutionally inadequate without "specific standards to ensure its
equal application. ,,52 The Court identified several examples of
potential arbitrariness that might arise without a more specific rule.
The test for accepting and rejecting contested ballots "might vary
not only from county to county but indeed within a single county
from one recount team to another. ,,53 Moreover, in some counties,
only undervotes were recounted, while in others, the recount
extended to all ballots.54 And in counties where only undervotes
were recounted, the system discriminated against individuals who
had "mark[ed] two candidates in a way discernable by the machine
. . . even if a manual examination of the ballot would reveal the

50. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,106 (2000).
51. See Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1243.
52. Bush, 531 U.S. at 106.

53.Id
54. See id. at 107.

HeinOnline -- 47 Wayne L. Rev. 972 2001-2002

2001]

OUR UNSE1TLED ELECTION

973

requisite indicia of intent. ,,55
As I have already argued, many of these anomalies might have
been resolved if the Supreme Court had only allowed the recount
procedure to run its course and the circuit judge to make ultimate
findings that might have regularized the process. Suppose we
assume arguendo that no such regularization would have occurred.
Does the kind of disparate treatment of ballots that the Court
describes violate the Equal Protection Clause?
A striking feature of the Court's opinion is its failure to utilize
any of the normal machinery of equal protection analysis. There is
no discussion of the relevant classes, no articulation of the
appropriate level of review, no effort to determine whether a
"purpose" or "effects" test is appropriate, no weighing of the
countervailing state interest supporting the classification. One must
sympathize with the justices, who had to produce their opinions
under extraordinary time pressure. Moreover, even when opinions
can be written at a more leisurely pace, there are circumstances
where analytical casualness can be a virtue. In cases where the
Court wishes to appeal to widely recognized moral truths,
hypertechnicallegal analysis can sometimes be more distracting
than illuminating.56 But on this occasion, something like the
opposite problem arises. Although time pressure no doubt made it
exceedingly difficult for the Court to come to grips with complex
analytical problems, the fact remains that its failure to think
55. Id at 108.
56. Although reasonable people can certainly disagree, I believe that Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), was such a case. In Romer, the Court appealed to
"transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society,"
and "our constitutional tradition" to invalidate a provision of the Colorado
constitution that prohibited the state or any of its subdivisions from protecting
homosexuals against claims of discrimination. Id. at 631, 633. For my somewhat
ambivalent defense of the decision, see Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's
Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT.
REv. 67 (1996). That defense was explicitly premised upon a contestable view
about the moral status of homosexuality. The defensibility of the analytic
casualness of the Bush v. Gore majority is similarly dependent upon contestable
political and moral judgments. See infra pp. 1013-18.
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carefully about doctrinal structure led it to miss the underlying
moral questions it needed to examine.
Consider first the failure to identify the disadvantaged class.
Defining such a class turns out to be quite difficult. Perhaps the
class consists of voters whose votes were not counted but would
have been had canvassing boards utilized a relatively more forgiving
standard. For simplicity, I will call voters whose intent was
controversial "dimplers." It might be supposed that dimplers in
precincts using the stringent standard were treated unequally when
compared to dimplers in precincts utilizing a forgiving standard.
Whereas dimplers from forgiving precincts were lumped together
with nondimplers, dimplers in stringent precincts were not.
But this definition of the relevant classes turns out to be too
imprecise. The dimplers located in the two kinds of precincts can
be subdivided into two other, crosscutting classes: Some dimplers
meant to cast ballots for President, while others did not. I will call
these two groups, "voters" and "abstainers," respectively. True,
dimplers from stringent precincts were disadvantaged if they were
also voters, but they were not disadvantaged if they were abstainers.
Conversely, dimplers from forgiving precincts were disadvantaged
if they were abstainers,s7 but they were not disadvantaged if they
were voters.
Suppose we focus on voting dimplers living in stringent
precincts. A uniformly applied forgiving standard would indeed
remedy their disadvantage. But such a standard would discriminate
against all abstaining dimplers, when compared to the class of
abstaining nondimplers, who indicated a desire in some other way,
for example, by leaving their ballots blank. Conversely, a
uniformly applied stringent standard vindicates the right of
abstaining dimplers living in forgiving precincts, but only by
creating state wide disadvantage for voting dimplers as compared to
voting nondimplers.
It turns out then, that any uniform standard creates a class of
57. I am assuming here that individuals are disadvantaged when their votes
are counted for a candidate they did not intend to vote for.
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people disadvantaged vis a vis another class. There is no apparent
reason to suppose that a uniform standard creates more equality
than a nonuniform standard. For example, if we assume that most
dimplers are also voters, then a nonuniform standard counting the
vote of some dimplers may create more equality than a uniform
unforgiving standard failing to count the votes of any dimplers.
Conversely, if most dimplers are abstainers, then nonuniformity
may create more equality than uniform leniency.
Ordinary equal protection doctrine has resources for dealing
with problems of this sort-techniques that the Court might have
taken advantage of, if only it had paid some attention to the
standard doctrine. There are two possible solutions. Sometimes, the
Court avoids the difficulty by insisting upon more finely tuned, less
rule-like standards.58 For example, suppose a state is trying to
determine whether teachers who are more than four months
pregnant are physically fit to teach.59 This problem has the same
structure as the dimpler dilemma. A uniform rule banning all such
teachers will discriminate against those who are fit by lumping
them together with the nonfit. In contrast, a uniform rule
permitting all pregnant teachers to continue teaching will allow
some women, who are physically unfit because of their pregnancy,
to continue. This solution therefore discriminates against teachers
forced to leave their jobs because of other, nonpregnancy-related
disabilities.
One way out of the dilemma is to abandon a uniform rule and
to look instead at individual teachers to determine, on the facts of
their particular cases, whether they are fit to teach. 6O Similarly, the
58. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (requiring
individualized judgment about whether unwed father had sufficient connection
to child to object to adoption); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (requiring
individualized determination of whether student transferring to state .university
from out of state was a resident of the state).
59. Cf. Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)
(invalidating school board rule that every pregnant school teacher must take
maternity leave without pay beginning five months before the expected birth of
her child).
60. See id. at 644 (invaliding rule requiring maternity leave after fourth
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Court might have solved the dimpler problem by insisting that
canvassing boards make individualized determinations of whether
dimplers intended to vote.
Of course, Bush v. Gore not only fails to pursue this solution;
the very constitutional defect it identifies is that the Florida Court
chose to pursue it. Perhaps the Court was correct to think that the
solution was less attractive when dealing with pregnant chads than
when dealing with pregnant teachers. The Court had some reason
to fear that if left to their own devices, individual canvassing
boards, faced with thousands of ballots to examine, would not
make individualized judgments about each ballot, but would instead
simply apply inconsistent but nonetheless rigid rules. The Court
might also have feared that politically motivated canvassing boards
might distort the rules to help the candidate they favored.
If these were the Court's concerns, then it was left with the
second solution to problems of this sort. This solution involves
determining whether a "purpose" or "effects" test should be
utilized. When the Court uses a purpose test, then facial uniformity
alone usually satisfies equal protection requirements. Even though
the statutory classification has the effect of treating some group
badly, the classification is usually upheld under "rational basis"
review unless the legislature has the purpose of disadvantaging a
suspect class. 61 For example, if the Court were to use a "purpose"
test in evaluating the pregnant teacher rule, it might hold that the
rule is unconstitutional if, but only if, it was enacted "because of"
rather than "in spite of" its impact on pregnant women. 62
month of pregnancy because "[t]here is no individualized determination by the
teacher's doctor-or the school board's [doctor]-as to any particular teacher's
ability to continue at her job"}.
61. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
62. Cj Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)
(holding that heightened scrutiny appropriate only when a state "selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group"). For the Court's
application of a similar test in the pregnancy context, see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974). The case was effectively overruled by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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In contrast, when the Court uses an effects test, a uniform
standard is subject to heightened review and often invalidated
simply because of its adverse impact even in the absence of proof
that the standard was meant to disadvantage a suspect class. Thus,
under an effects test, the pregnancy rule might be invalid because of
its impact on women even if the impact was not the purpose of the
rule. 63
The Court's prior decisions are not completely clear as to which
test is appropriate in the voting context. For example, the Court's
reapportionment decisions adopt an effects test. The Court did not
require a showing that legislatures had the purpose of
disadvantaging citizens living in underrepresented districts or that
the failure to redistrict was directed against a discrete and insular
minority. Because voting was deemed a "fundamental right," the
Court strictly scrutinized malapportioned districts simply because
they had the effect of making some votes worth less than others. 64
Similarly, in cases of absolute deprivation of the right to vote, the
Court has not usually required a showing of illicit purpose.65 Denial
of this fundamental right is subject to heightened review even when
there is no purpose to discriminate against an identifiable group.
In contrast, the Court has insisted on a showing of illicit
purpose in gerrymandering, vote dilution, and racial districting
cases.66 For example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,67 the Court
63. The Court has interpreted some statutory protections of civil rights as
embodying an effects test. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (holding that employment practices having a disproportionate racial effect
are illegal in absence of a "business necessity").
64. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland City, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
65. See, e.g., Phoenixv. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
66. Michael McConnell therefore oversimplifies current doctrine when he
asserts that "in cases involving fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, the
Court applies strict scrutiny to all disparities, without regard to whether the
disparities reflect discrimination against any protected group. " McConnell, supra
note 2, at 673.
67. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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considered the constitutionality of redrawing the boundary lines
for Tuskeegee, Alabama in a fashion that excluded virtually all
African-Americans from the jurisdiction.68 Although the opinion
is somewhat ambiguous,69 subsequent cases have declared this action
unconstitutional only because the redrawing purposely deprived
African-Americans of the franchise. 70 Similarly, the COU!'t has on
occasion rejected vote-dilution claims despite a showing that an
electoral system had the effect of reducing the value of AfricanAmerican votes?1 The Court has insisted that this showing be
supplemented by a further demonstration that those who created
the scheme intended to produce the effect.72 Although it has
acknowledged that the requisite purpose will almost always be
present, the Court has nonetheless insisted that the desire to reduce
the voting power of a political group is also a necessary component
of political gerrymandering cases.73 Additionally, in its most recent
68. See id. at 340.
69. The Court noted that if the allegations contained in the complaint were
true, "the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes
to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with
segregating white and colored voters." Id at 341. This language sounds in
purpose. However, in the next paragraph, the Court went on to say that "[ilt is
difficult to appreciate what stands in the way of adjudging a statute having this
inevitable effect invalid." Id at 342.
70. In Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977), the Court described Gomillion as a case where "a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state
action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face." Id at 266.
71. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55 (1980); cf. id. at 113 (Marshall, ]., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., Lodge, 458 U.S. at 613; Bolden, 446 U.S. at 55; if. id at 113
(Marshall,]., dissenting) (arguing that vote dilution cases should be decided under
the principle that "if a classification 'impinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, ... strict judicial scrutiny'
is required, ... regardless of whether the infringement was intentional" (citations
omitted).
73. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127, 129 (1986) ("[1]n order to
succeed the Bandemer plaintiffs were required to prove . . • intentional
discrimination against an identifiable political group.... As long as redistricting
is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely
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racial districting cases, the Coun has made clear that an intent to
segregate voters by race is crucial to a claimed constitutional
violation.74
The Coun has never offered a complete theoretical justification
for distinguishing between these two lines of authority,75 so it is
difficult to know whether a purpose or effects test is appropriate on
the facts of Bush v. Gore. The imponant point, though, is that the
Coun's ultimate conclusion cannot be justified regardless of the test
utilized
Suppose that the recount procedure authorized by the Florida
Supreme Coun is analogized to malapportioned legislatures or
absolute deprivations of the right to vote. Then, we would ask only
whether a panicular group of voters were deprived of the franchise
and not worry about whether the decision in question was meant
to bring about this state of affairs.76 But as noted above, under this
test, both a stringent uniform rule and a forgiving uniform rule
would be unconstitutional unless justified by a compelling state
interest, because both rules have the effect of depriving someone of
their franchise rights. A uniformly stringent rule prejudices voting
dimplers, while a uniformly forgiving rule prejudices abstaining
dimplers.77
This problem, in tum, suggests both reasons why a purpose test
is sometimes attractive and a way of identifying the sorts of
problems for which it is appropriate. When the legislature
completely deprives someone of the right to vote, or when it draws
district lines that violate the one-person, one-vote requirement, the
political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.")
74. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452, 1458 (2001) (holding that
the issue was whether "the legislature's motive was predominantly racial, not
political").
75. Cf. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 130 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that "at
various times the Court's decisions have seemed to adopt three inconsistent
approaches: (1) that purpose alone is the test for unconstitutionality; (2) that
effect alone is the test; and (3) that purpose or effect, either alone or in
combination, is sufficient to show unconstitutionality").
76. See supra p. 977-78.
77. See supra p. 974-75.

HeinOnline -- 47 Wayne L. Rev. 979 2001-2002

980

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:953

problem can be corrected simply by extending the franchise or
obeying the population equality requirement. An effects test is
therefore appropriate. In contrast, in other circumstances, an effects
test can lead to a finding of discrimination against some group
regardless of what the government does. For example, Tuskeegee
had to draw its city boundary lines somewhere.78 Whatever location
it chose, the effect of its decision would be to exclude some group
of potential voters: hence, the requirement that those challenging
the decision demonstrate a purpose of excluding AfricanAmericans?9 Similarly" however a legislature draws district lines,
the decision will have some effect on the distribution of political
power: hence, the requirement that those challenging the lines
demonstrate that they were drawn in order to produce this
distribution.80
H this analysis is correct, then Bush v. Gore may have been an
appropriate case for application of a purpose test because, as already
noted, any rule would have disadvantaged some people. But
insistence on such a test does not rescue the Court's opinion. On
the contrary, a striking fact about the Court's approach is that it
engaged in no inquiry into purpose. Perhaps the Court suspected
that Democrats were manipulating the rules to favor Al Gore, but
the Court never made this claim. There was no showing in the
record that the potential inconsistencies the Court discovered were
intended to disfranchise one group of voters or another, and the
Court insisted upon none. For all that appears, the putative
differences in treatment resulted from an entirely good faith effort
to make the best decisions possible under extremely trying
circumstances.
The upshot, then, is that the opinion will not withstand analysis
whichever test one uses. H an effects test is appropriate, then the
Court failed to explain why the uniform standard it insisted upon
did not have the unconstitutional effect of not respecting the wishes
of either the voting or nonvoting dimplers. H a purpose test is
78. See Gomillian v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
79. See id.
80. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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appropriate, then the Court failed explain its failure to discern a
purpose of disfranchising anyone.
Matters are made worse when one considers the problem of a
countervailing state interest. On conventional equal protection
analysis, even deprivations of fundamental rights are justified if the
countervailing interest is "compelling. ,,81 Yet the Bush Court did
not pause to consider whether there were such interests at all, much
less how strong they were.
Two interests suggest themselves. The first is local control. For
better or worse, Florida election administration is decentralized.
Different counties use different equipment, have different rules, and
have widely differing error rates. 82 The Florida Supreme Court left
this local control intact by refusing to impose a uniform standard
and by vesting the task of conducting the recount in local officials.
Of course, an inevitable result of local control is local variation,
and variation can always be characterized as discrimination. Is local
control a compelling state interest that justifies this sort of
discrimination when it differentially affects the right to vote? In
other contexts, the Court has placed great emphasis on
decentralization. For example, it has held that unequal funding for
education is constitutionally permissible when supported by the
interest in local control83 and that otherwise required desegregation
plans cannot be imposed when they might require the breaching of
81. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that at certain
points in pregnancy, a state's "interests become sufficiently compelling to"
overcome a woman's fundamental right to an abortion); if. Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236-37 (1995) (holding that compelling
state interest test does not mean that strict scrutiny is necessarily "fatal in fact")
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment».
82. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5604 (West 2000) (authorizing the board of
county commissioners of any county to purchase and "provide for the use of any
electronic or electromechanical voting system approved by the Department of
State"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.012 (West 2000) (giving local election boards
power to conduct voting); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.031(1) (West 2000) (giving
local election boards power to maintain order at polls); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§102.141 (West 2000) (setting out duties of county canvassing boards).
83. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,54-55 (1973).
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local, jurisdictional boundaries. 84
Perhaps voting, unlike education or integration, is sufficiently
important to outweigh the arguments for local control, but the
Court nowhere suggests that it is. Such a suggestion would have
revolutionary implications, requiring the rewriting of election laws
throughout the country. More to the point, the Court's decision in
Bush itself left in place pre-recount results, certified by local boards
using widely different equipment and employing different rules. In
contrast, the Florida Court made clear that the state-wide recount
procedure would be administered by a single judge, who would
have had the task of unifying and rationalizing local recounts if the
procedure had been allowed to run its course. Hence, if local
control is really not a sufficiently important countervailing state
interest to justify nonuniformity, it is hard to understand why it
was not the underlying election, rather than the recount procedure,
that was unconstitutional.
This difficulty suggests that the Court's liberal apologists, who
have argued that Bush v. Gore presages a major constitutional assault
on state election laws,85 have misinterpreted the decision. Samuel
Issacharoff, for example, has argued that the rule established in Bush

v. Gore
obviously cannot be limited to the recount process alone.
The court condemns the fact that "standards for accepting
or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from
county to county but indeed within a single county.» That
criticism would surely apply to the variations in voting
machines across Florida, and, for that matter, to similar
variations in all other states. The court's new standard may
create a more robust constitutional examination of voting
practices. 86
Well, maybe. There is no way to know what future courts will
84. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
85. See Issacharoff, supra note 10.
86.Id (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,106 (2000».
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make of past decisions. One thing we do know, however, is that the
Bush majority did everything within its power to avoid a broad
interpretation of its decision. The Court is careful to observe that
"[0]ur consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the
problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents
many complexities."87 This qualification, apparently inserted at the
insistence ofJustice O'Connor,88 makes it about as clear as possible
that the Court wanted its decision to be treated like a restricted
railroad ticket "good for this day and train only."89
The Court goes on to note that "[t]he question before the Court
is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may
develop different systems for implementing elections. Instead, we
are presented with a situation where a state court with the power
to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal
procedural safeguards."9O This distinction is incoherent. Surely a
state court should be allowed to displace only so much of the
statutory scheme as is necessary to provide a remedy. If local
control is a sufficiently compelling interest to justify statewide
statutes that permit discrimination between residents living in
different parts of the state, then a state court is also justified when
it leaves this local control intact. But whether the distinction is
coherent or not, the Supreme Court obviously takes it seriously.
Otherwise, there is no explanation for the Court's decision, which
had the effect of restoring the totally decentralized system that
produced massive differences in voting procedures and error rates
throughout the state.
This problem leads to the second compelling state interest that
might have justified the recount-an interest that, ironically, is not
87. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,109 (2000).
88. See Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority alOne, N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 2001, § 6, at
32.

89. Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts,J., dissenting)
("[T]he instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends
to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad
ticket, good for this day and train only.").
90. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109.
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countervailing at all. It is the very interest that the Court purported
to defend: the interest in an equal right to vote. The Florida Court
might plausibly have believed that this right was denied by the
undercounting of large numbers of ballots. The recount was
designed to correct just this inequality. Of course, as indicated
above, the recount had the potential to introduce inequality as well.
In a perfect world, with infinite time, the Florida court might have
fashioned a recount scheme that more closely tracked the intent of
each voter. But surely the appropriate comparison is not with a
hypothetical perfect world, but with the real world that the Vnited
States Supreme Court created by its decision. On that standard, the
Florida court plainly did a better job of avoiding the constitutional
difficulty identified by the V nited States Supreme Court than the
V nited States Supreme Court itself did. In order to prevent some
disputed ballots from being ignored, the Vnited States Supreme
Court required that all be ignored. It thereby achieved an equality
of sorts between classes of voters casting "undervotes" or
"overvotes," but only by creating massive inequality between these
disfranchised citizens on the one hand and the citizens whose votes
counted on the other.

2. The Mythical § 5 Deadline
Neither the Florida court nor the V nited States Supreme Court
would have been put to this hard choice but for the putative
December 12 deadline supposedly imposed by 3 V.S.C. § 5.91 But
for this deadline, any deficiencies in the Florida recount procedure
could have been corrected. It is therefore important to understand
that the deadline had no basis in law. It was manufactured out of
whole cloth by the Supreme Court itself.
As even the Supreme Court acknowledged, § 5 offers a "safe
harbor" rather than requiring Florida to complete the selection
process by December 12.92 The statute provides that
91.3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
92. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000).
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If [a] final determination of any controversy or contest
concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of
[a] State [is] made at least six days before the time fixed for
the meeting of the electors, [it] shall be conclusive, and shall
govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in
the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the
ascertainment of the electors appointed by [the] State is
concerned.93
This language makes clear that Florida was under no statutory
obligation to resolve the dispute by December 12. The statute
might nonetheless have provided a strong incentive for Florida to
do so. If it were true that Florida might be subject to a federal
resolution of a dispute that it would rather settle itself, then the
state might have a good reason to incorporate the § 5 deadline into
its own law. But it is bizarre for the Court to rely on Florida's
interest in settling its own electoral disputes when it was the United
States Supreme Court that displaced Florida's resolution with the
federal resolution that it mandated. Instead of a shield protecting
state processes, the Supreme Court turned § 5 into a sword,
preventing those processes from running their course.94 Moreover,
it is far from clear that § 5 creates a "safe harbor" or, conversely,
that failure to meet the § 5 deadline would permit a federal
resolution. First, the entire procedure set forth in Title III is of
doubtful constitutionality.95 By its terms, the Twelfth Amendment
93. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
94. Of course, the Florida legislature might have been concerned about a
settlement imposed by the Florida courts. But that concern would not have
provided a motive for the legislature to adopt the § 5 deadline. As employed by
the Supreme Coun, the deadline had the effect of transferring the entire
controversy to the federal level. It precluded both the state court, and the state
legislature, from resolving the dispute.
95. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy andDisorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 695,
697 (2001). As Richard Pildes notes, seven dissenting members of the House
Committee that reported the Electoral Count Act of 1887 advanced powerful
constitutional arguments against it. See id. at 697 n.l0 (2001) (citing Electoral
Count Act, 49th Cong., 2d Sess., in 18 Congo Rec. H. 47 (Dec. 8, 1866) (Rep.
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limits the role of Congress to that of spectator. It requires no more
than the "presence" of Representatives and Senators while "the
votes shall ... be counted.,,96 Unlike Article I, Section 5, which
makes Congress "the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members, ,,97 the Constitution provides no
textual support for the notion that Congress has the authority to
resolve or cut off a dispute about the legality of a presidential
election.
Of course, the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress
to enact legislation "for carrying into Execution [the powers]
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States.,,98 But the necessary and proper clause is not a warrant for
disobeying other sections of the Constitution.99 To the extent that
the § 5 procedure "resolved" a dispute in a fashion that negated the
state legislature's power to "appoint [electors] in such Manner as
... [it] may direct,,,lOO Congress lacks the constitutional authority to
give it conclusive force. Thus, as a constitutional matter, it is
doubtful that § 5 can insulate a slate of electors against claims that
they were selected in a fashion contrary to that specified by the
state legislature.
It is possible that the Supreme Court would hold that the
constitutionality of § 5 is a nonjusticiable political question. 101 But
Dibble)).
96. U.S. CONST. art. n, § 1, d. 3.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, d. 1.
98. U.S. CONST. art. n, § 8, d. 18.
99. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819)
(observing that implied powers of Congress do not extend to cases where
"measures •.. are prohibited by the constitution.").
100. U.S. CONST. art. IT, § 1, d. 2.
101. SeeCalabresi, supra note 2 (arguing that the Supreme Court should have
left the election controversy to the political branches). As Samuel Issacharoff
makes clear, the Electoral Count Act was motivated, at least in part, by the
desire to keep the courts out of presidential election disputes. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. Cm. L. REv. 637, 652 (2001); cf. Dorf &
Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 934 (suggesting that "when- -as in Bush v. Gore . .. the substantive political payoff of any procedural regime can be clearly predicted,
any attempt to ground judicial intervention in legal principle will be read as a
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the Court's willingness to adjudicate the dispute in Bush v. Gore102
itself substantially reduces the probability of such a holding.
Moreover, the putative nonjusticiability of § 5 actually reduces its
effectiveness as a safe harbor. A court that would not adjudicate the
constitutionality of § 5 presumably would not enforce it either,
thereby leaving to Congress the decision whether to give conclusive
weight to a state determination reached before the deadline. If § 5
is unenforceable, then it is hardly a safe harbor. And even if § 5
were constitutional, and even if the Court would enforce its terms,
it is doubtful that Congress would be bound by it. Congress cannot
prevent itself from repealing its own prior legislation,I03 and a
Congress that chose not to follow the terms of § 5 could simply put
in place another procedure inconsistent with it.
For all these reasons, there was little cause for Florida to be
concerned about the § 5 deadline. Still, it is not the function of the
Supreme Court to weigh the wisdom of a state legislative decision.
If the Florida legislature decided to incorporate the § 5 deadline
into its own law, the Supreme Court would be bound by this
decision. But the Florida legislature did no such thing. There is no
language in the Florida code remotely suggesting that election
contests had to be completed before December 12. T ellingly, the
Supreme Court majority cites no such language. Instead, it relied on
a statement made by the Florida Supreme Court.104 According to
political smokescreen"}.
102.531 U.S. 98 (2000).
103. For good discussions, see Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the
Capacity a/Congress to Control theFuture, 13 HAsTINGSCONST. L.Q. 185 (1986);
Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 381.
104. The majority does better than Chief Justice Rehnquist, who relies on
the United States Supreme Court's own prior statement. He writes that "[t]he
scope and nature of the remedy ordered by the Florida Supreme Court
jeopardizes the 'legislative wish' to take advantage of the safe harbor provided by
3 U.S.C. § 5." [d. at 120-21 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). A casual reader might
suppose that the interior quotation comes from the Florida Court's
interpretation of Florida law. Instead, the reference is to the United States
Supreme Court's own prior decision, in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Ed. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 120-21. The referenced language is worth quoting in its
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the per curiam, "[t]he Supreme Court of Florida has said that the
legislature intended the State's electors to 'participate fully in the
federal electoral process,' as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5."105
It is important to understand that the Florida court made the
statement upon which the United States Supreme Court relied in
a radically different context. The Florida court mentioned the § 5
deadline in conjunction with the establishment of a timetable for
completion of the protest phase. 106 Until the protest was resolved,
the Florida Secretary of State could not certify a winner of the
election. 107 Without a certified winner, the names of the winning
electors could not be forwarded to Washington. 108 There was
therefore some possibility, albeit remote, that the state's electors
might be unable to participate. In contrast, the contest phase begins
only after the electors are certified. 109 The Florida court never held
that the contest phase had to be completed before December 12.
entirety:
The Florida Supreme Court cited 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-10 in a footnote of its
opinion . . . hut did not discuss § 5. Since § 5 contains a principle of
federal law that would assure finality of the State's determination if
made pursuant to a state law in effect before the election, a legislative
wish to take advantage of the "safe harbor" would counsel against any
construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to be a
change in the l a w . .
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (emphasis
added), rev'g 772 So. 2d 1220 (pIa. 2000). This transmogrification of the United
States Supreme Court's groundless speculation about a possible legislative wish
relating to a different part of the Florida code into a holding of the Florida
Supreme Court is enough to give bootstrapping a bad name.
105. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110 (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v.
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1284 (pIa. 2000».
106. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1289.
107. See id. (delaying certification until completion of protest phase).
108. See 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) (providing that the executive of each state shall
send certificate of ascertainment of the electors appointed "as soon as practicable
after the conclusion of the appointment of the electors in such State by the final
ascertainment, under and in pursuance of the laws of such State providing for
such ascertainment" Id).
109. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (1) (Supp. 2001) (providing that
certification may be contested in Circuit Court).
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Indeed, it seems to have said something like the opposite:
The need for prompt resolution and finality is especially
critical in presidential elections where there is an outside
deadline established by federal law. Notwithstanding,
consistent with the legislative mandate and our precedent,
although the time constraints are limited, we must do
everything required by law to ensure that legal votes that
have not been counted are included in the final election
results. 110
Justice Shaw dissented from this conclusion and agreed with the
United States Supreme Court that a statewide recount during the
contest phase was unlawfu1. 111 Yet even Justice Shaw could not
accept the United States Supreme Court's tendentious reading of
Florida law. As he wrote after the United States Supreme Coun
prohibited the recount:
December 12 was not a "drop dead" date under Florida law.
In fact, I question whether any date prior to January 6 is a
drop-dead date under the Florida election scheme.
December 12 was simply a permissive "safe-harbor" date to
which the states could aspire. It certainly was not a
mandatory contest deadline under the plain language of the
Florida Election Code (i.e., it is not mentioned there) or
this Court's prior rulingS.112
Perhaps a majority of Justice Shaw's colleagues would have
disagreed with him had they been given the chance, although there
is nothing in their previous opinions suggesting that they would
have done so. In any event, they were never given the chance.
Instead of remanding the question for a holding by the Florida
110. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1261 (FIa. 2000) (emphasis added).
111. See id. at 127()"73 (Shaw, J., concurring in dissent by Justice Harding).
112. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 528-29 (FIa. 2000) (Shaw, J.,
concurring).
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court, the United States Supreme Court simply manufactured such
a holding, thereby abruptly prohibiting the recount pursuant to an
implausible interpretation of state law never adopted by any
court.1l3
In order to fabricate this statutory requirement in the absence
of any statutory language, the Supreme Court resoned to a double
standard that can only be described as cynical. It was, after all, the
United States Supreme Court that had earlier chastised the Florida
113. Nelson Lund has argued that the Supreme Court in fact gave the
Florida court the opportunity to "reexamine the state law question itself."
Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness o/Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REv.
(forthcoming). Lund insists that "[c]ontrary to a widespread misperception, the
Supreme Court did not forbid the Florida court from attempting to conduct a
statewide recount under constitutionally permissible standards." On this view,
the failure of the Florida Court to address this issue must be attributed to Al
Gore, who declined to ask the state court to do so.
This eccentric reading of the Supreme Court's actions amounts to blaming
the victim. Is it conceivable that Lund and other conservative defenders of the
Bush position would have adopted the same stance if Vice President Gore had in
fact sought a recount in the teeth of the Supreme Court's decision and if the
Florida court had ordered one? How plausible is it that the United States
Supreme Court would have silently accepted such an action by the Florida
court?
Lund derives his conclusion from the fact that the Supreme Court remanded
the case "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion," rather than
ordering an outright dismissal. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
Unfortunately for Lund's argument, the opinion with which the further
proceedings could not be inconsistent was very clear. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Breyer endorsed the possibility of remanding the case to the Florida court
to consider conducting a constitutionally permissible recount. See id. at 146. The
majority explicitly rejected this possibility:
Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature
intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5, JUSTICE
BREYER's proposed remedy-remanding to the Florida Supreme Court
for its ordering of a constitutionally proper contest until December
18-contemplates action in violation of the Florida Election Code, and
hence could not be part of an "appropriate" order authorized by FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (Supp.2001).
Id. at 111. Surely, a decision on remand that a recount was indeed "part of an
'appropriate' order" would have been "inconsistent with [the Supreme Court's]
opinion" and, therefore, in violation of the remand order.
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court for going beyond the state statutory framework in violation
of Article II.114 Perhaps the Florida Court did indeed exceed the
normal bounds of statutory construction when it extended the
length of the protest period, but at least the Florida court pointed
to provisions in the statute that arguably supported its
conclusion. us In contrast, the United States Supreme Court gave
dispositive weight to an interpretation of state law unsupported by
any statutory language contained anywhere in the Florida code.
Thus, the Supreme Court's final decision is in blatant violation of
its own interpretation of Article II.

114. See supra pp. 967-69.
115. The Florida court held that the provisions of Florida law providing for
manual recounts conflicted with the provision establishing a seven-day deadline
for election boards to submit their returns to the Elections Canvassing
Commission. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273,
1285-87 (Fla. 2000). Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West 1982 & Supp.
2001) (providing for manual recounts) with id. §§ 102.111-.112 (providing that
boards must submit their returns to Elections Canvassing Commission by the
seventh day following the election). The Florida court stated:
Although the Code sets no specific deadline by which a manual recount
must be completed, the time required to complete a manual recount
must be reasonable. Otherwise, the recount provision would be, in
effect, meaningless. • . • The recount provision thus conflicts with
sections 102.111 and 102.112, which state that the Boards "must" submit
their returns to the Elections Canvassing Commission by 5 p.m. of the
seventh day following the election or face penalties•...
Manual recounts oftentimes may be incomplete on the seventh day
following the election. In such a case, if the seven-day limit were to be
strictly enforced, the manual recount provision would be eviscerated
and rendered meaningless. The Legislature could not have intended such
a result. The seven-day limit thus must be construed in a flexible
manner to accommodate the manual recount provision.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1285-87. Reasonable people
might disagree with this interpretation of Florida law, but at least it constitutes
an effort to interpret statutory language. In contrast, the United States Supreme
Court cited no language in any Florida statute suggesting that Florida meant to
incorporate the federal "safe harbor" deadline into its own law.
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3. The Mythical Article II Problem
In its first decision, the United States Supreme Court focused on
the Florida Court's extension of the statutory deadline for
completion of the protest phase. Without quite saying so, the Court
implied that this extension might constitute a judicial change of
Florida election law, prohibited by Article IT, Section 1, Clause 2
and making unavailable the statutory "safe harbor" provision of 3
U.S.C. § 5. 116 Whatever one thought of this argument, it had
plainly become moot by the time the Court turned its attention to
the controversy for a second time. At this point, the protest phase
had ended, the deadline extension was irrelevant, and the issue
before the Court was the propriety of a state-wide recount the
Florida Supreme Court had ordered pursuant to its broad statutory
powers to administer the contest phase. 117
Undeterred by this embarrassment, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for himself, and Justices Scalia and Thomas, set about
looking for other instances where the Florida court had
misunderstood its own law.11 8 One must note at the outset the
extraordinary nature of this endeavor. At least since Erie Railroad
116. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 75-76
(2000).
117. Some commentators seem not to have understood this point. For
example, Richard Epstein devotes a considerable portion of his defense of the
United States Supreme Court to an argument that the canvassing boards were
not authorized to conduct the hand recounts that Gore requested in his protest
and that the Florida Supreme Court erred in ordering an extension of the protest
period. See Richard Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May
Direct": The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 621-29
(2001). Even if he is correct about both ofthese points (and it is not clear that he
is-see supra note 115), they are irrelevant to the legal issues confronting the
Supreme Court in Bush 7J. Gore, which concerned the contest, rather than the
protest procedures. Cj McConnell, supra note 2, at 666 (arguing that "by the
time the case got to the High Court, the new deadline had already passed,
Governor Bush had been certified the winner, and the legal conflict had moved
on to a new phase, rendering Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris all
but moot").
118. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring).
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Co. v. Tompkins,119 it has been clear that state court decisions
concerning the content of state law are almost always
constitutionally binding on federal COUrts.120
Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed that this general rule was
modified by Article IT, § 1, which requires that presidential electors
be appointed "in such Manner as the [state legislature] may
direct.,,121 In support of this assertion, he relied upon a single,
convoluted sentence of dicta in McPherson v. Blacker,122 which
suggested that there were federal constitutional limitations on the
extent to which states could deprive legislatures of the appointment
function. 123 The sentence, in its entirety, reads as follows: "Hence
the insertion of those words [providing for the appointment of
electors in the manner that the state legislature may direct], while

operating as a limitation upon the State in respect ofany attempt to
circumscribe the legislative power, cannot be held to operate as a
limitation on that power itself. ,,124
This reliance is ironic to say the least, since McPherson had
upheld a state court's interpretation of its own statutory scheme
against federal challenge and strongly rejected federal supervision
(including federal judicial supervision) of the selection process.125
Moreover, on the facts before the Court, it is hard to see how
the "State" was attempting to "'circumscribe the legislative
power.',,126 In the Court's first consideration of the Article IT
119.304 U.S. 64 (1938).
120. See id.
121. U.S. CONST. art. II; § 1.
122. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
123. See id. at 25.
124.Id. (emphasis added).
125. At issue was a Michigan statute directing that some electors be chosen
by congressional districts, rather than on a state-wide basis. See id. at 24.
Observing that "[the state] legislative power is the supreme authority except as
limited by the constitution of the State, and the sovereignty of the people is
exercised through their representatives in the legislature unless by the
fundamental law power is elsewhere reposed," Id. at 25, the Court rejected a
challenge to the statute.
126. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 77 (2000)
(quotingMcPher.;on, 146 U.S. at 25).
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problem, the Justices worried that the Florida court had relied in
part on the Florida Constitution. l27 Perhaps a state constitutional
provision could impermissibly "circumscribe" legislative power
with respect to the selection of electors. 128 But Justice Rehnquist
had no such claim before him in Bush v. Gore. Instead, he was
confronted with the Florida court's interpretation of its own state's
statutes. The Florida legislature specifically authorized the Florida
courts to play this role. Unlike the protest procedure, which is
administered by state canvassing boards vested with considerable
discretion as to how to proceed, the contest procedu~e is initiated
by filing a complaint in the state circuit court. 129 The legislature
chose to provide the court with exceptionally broad powers to
administer the proceedings, including the power to "fashion such
orders as [the court] deem[s] necessary to ensure that each allegation
in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent
or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate
under such circumstances. ,,130
Surely, the legislature intended the state courts to engage in the
ordinary process of statutory construction in the coursc~ of applying
the statutory scheme. Of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed
that the construction adopted by the Florida court was not
127. See id. (observing that "[t]here are expressions in the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Florida that may be read to indicate that it construed the
Florida Election Code without regard to the extent to which the Florida
Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, § 1, d. 2 'circumscribE: the legislative
power"').
128. Although the Court relied upon McPherson v. Blacker in ,expressing this
concern, see Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76, there is language
in McPherson that cuts the other way. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25 ("What is
forbidden or required to be done by a State is forbidden or r.equired of the
legislative power under state constitutions as they exist.").
129. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102-168(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 2001); cf. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 102.171 (West Supp. 2001) (providing that "[t]he jurisdiction to
hear any contest of the election of a member of either house of the Legislature
is vested in the applicable house, as each house, pursuant to § 2, Art. ill of the
State Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications, elections, and returns
of its members.").
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001).
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"ordinary.,,131 But rules concerning the appropriate techniques of
statutory construction do not make up a "'transcendental body of
law outside of any particular State,,,132 any more than the common
law does. What counts as "ordinary" construction is, itself, a matter
for state law. In the special context of the selection of electors,
Article n vests this lawmaking power in the state legislature, and
not in the federal courts.
Perhaps if the state legislature meant to delegate this authority
to the federal courts, Anicle n would require couns to respect this
decision. But to the extent that we can infer a legislative intent
about this matter at all, it appears far more likely that the Florida
legislature intended for Florida couns to have the last word on how
state law should be construed. As noted above, the legislature vested
the state courts with authority to administer the contest
procedures. 133 In contrast, the state legislature made no provision
for a United States Supreme Coun role and there is no indication
whatever that it meant for the federal couns to have the ultimate
authority to interpret the state statutes at issue.
Obviously, federal couns do not require state permission to
review federal questions arising in state coun, and, indeed, any
effort to foreclose such review would, itself, have been
unconstitutional. 134 Still, the particular federal question at issue here
was whether the state coun had "circumscribed" state legislative
power in violation of Anicle n.135 Answering that question, in
tum, requires discerning the legislature'S intent regarding how
disputed questions about the interpretation of the statutory scheme
should be resolved. Since the legislature clearly contemplated a
state judicial role in the contest procedures and was silent
131. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000).
132. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black
& White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,}., dissenting).
133. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West Supp. 2001).
134. See generally Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)
(holding that state courts are bound by United States Supreme Court
interpretations of federal law).
135. See supra p. 993.
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concerning an analogous federal role,136 it seems plausible to assume
that it meant for state, rather than federal judges to have the final
word on disputed issues of state law. Hence, there is a good
argument that Chief Justice Rehnquist's insistence on the primacy
of his reading of Florida law 137 itself amounts to an unconstitutional
effort to "circumscribe" state legislative power.
In any event, the particular instances of putative judicial
misinterpretation identified by Chief Justice Rehnquist are
singularly unconvincing. In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board,138 the Florida court's extension of a clearly articu.lated sevenday deadline for completion of the protest phase troubled the
Supreme Court.B9 To be sure, the state court offered plausible
reasons why the legislature could not have intended th(! deadline to
render nugatory the underlying protest right,14O but one can
nevertheless understand the concern triggered when a court ignores
the "plain meaning" of statutory language. In contrast, there simply
is no such "plain meaning" objection to the state court's
interpretation of the contest statute.
Chief Justice Rehnquist identified two problems with the
Florida court's interpretation of Florida law. First, he complained
that the Florida court "empt[ied] certification of virtually all legal
consequence during the contest, [thereby] ... depart[ing] from the
provisions enacted by the Florida Legislature. ,,141 But it is telling
that the ChiefJustice cited no specific provision of the code that the
state court departed from in its treatment of the contest phase. In
fact, there is no such provision.
The code establishes two separate procedures for challenging
election results. First, any candidate or elector is entitled to protest
the returns to the appropriate canvassing board. 142 In <:::onjunction
136. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West Supp. 2001).
137. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
138.531 U.S. 70 (2000).
139. See id. at 78.
140. See supra note 115.
141. Bush, 531 U.S. at 118 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
142. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West Supp. 2001).
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with this protest, a candidate or political party can request that the
canvassing board conduct a manual recount. H3 The canvassing
board is given discretion to conduct a test recount. 144 If this recount
"indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the
outcome of the election,,,145 the board is given the option to
[m]anually recount all ballots. ,,146
Second, after canvassing board has completed its work and the
election is certified, the unsuccessful candidate or any elector or
taxpayer is authorized to file a contest with the circuit court. 147 The
statute lists a number of grounds for contesting the election,
including "rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change
or place in doubt the result of the election"l48 and "[a]ny other cause
or allegation which, if sustained, would show that a person other
than the successful candidate was the person duly •.. elected."H9
The circuit judge, in tum, is authorized to "fashion such orders as
he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the
complaint is ... examined"150 and to "provide any relief appropriate
under such circumstances. ,,151
Nothing in this scheme remotely suggests that the circuit court
should be bound during the contest phase by canvassing board
decisions rendered during the protest phase. On the contrary, the
statute provides that the canvassing board is to be named as the
defendant in contest actions,152 with the whole purpose of the
contest being to challenge canvassing board decisions. The
legislature might have provided that canvassing board decisions
should be affirmed unless they were clearly erroneous or

143. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(a) (West Supp. 2001).
144. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(c) (West Supp. 2001).
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (West Supp. 2001).
146. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5)(c) (West Supp. 2001).
147. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West Supp. 2001) ..
148. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c) (West Supp. 2001).
149. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(e) (West Supp. 2001).
150.Id.
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001).
152. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(4) (West Supp. 2001).
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constituted an abuse of discretion. It did not do SO.15.1 Instead, it
authorized the circuit judge to determine for herself whether the
board had "reject[ed] ... a number of legal votes sufficient to
change or place in doubt the result of the election. "154 ChiefJustice
Rehnquist's reliance on the fact that the code "cllearly vests
discretion whether to recount in the boards, and sets strict deadlines
subject to the Secretary's rejection of late tallies and mo netary fines
for tardiness,,155 is therefore misplaced. Canvassing boards are given
discretion whether to order recounts 156 and are subject to a
statutory deadline for completing their work during the protest
phase. 157 But once that work is completed, the statute also provides
a mechanism through which its ultimate decisi()n can be
overturned. It clearly grants the circuit court the powe:r to "ensure
that each allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or
checked"158 and to "correct any alleged wrong."159 It is the Chief
Justice's refusal to acknowledge these broad powers, rather than the
Florida Court's reliance upon them, that distorts the statutory
scheme.
Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist's refusal to heed. the "plain
language" of the statute would be defensible if th:~t language
153. The election code provides that "[t]he certificate of election which is
issued to any person shall be prima facie evidence of the election of such person."
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.155 (West Supp. 2001). This provision (~ablishes no
more than that a person challenging the certification has the bW'den of going
forward. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (7thed. 1999) (defining "prima facie
evidence" as "[e]vidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless
contradictory evidence is produced"). If the drafters had intended the contesting
party to establish an abuse of discretion or clear and convincing evidence of a
legal error, they surely would not have said that a certificate est.ablishes only
prima facie evidence of election.
154. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c) (West Supp. 2001).
155. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 118 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.]., (:oncurring).
156. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (West Supp. 2001) (authorizing
manual recounts during protest phase).
157. SeeFLA.STAT.ANN.§ 102.122 (WestSupp.2001) (establishing deadline
for submission of returns).

158.ld
159. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001).
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produced an absurd outcome. Rehnquist hints that this might be his
view when he accuses the Florida court of" empt[ying] certification
of virtually all legal consequence.,,160 What purpose is served by the
protest procedure, one might ask, if a court is empowered to review
de novo all of the canvassing board decisions?
Given his own criticism of the Florida Supreme Court for
ignoring the supposed plain meaning of the statute so as to avoid
what it considered an absurd result, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
implicit endorsement of this mode of statutory construction might
strike some as ironic. In any event, the concept of de novo review
is hardly anomalous, and we do not generally regard statutory
schemes creating such review as absurd. For example, some states
provide for trial of minor offenses before a judge, with an absolute
right to retrial de novo before a jury if the defendant is dissatisfied
with the outcome.161 All appellate systems provide for de novo
review of legal determinations made by lower courts. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court reviewed de novo the Florida court's
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.162 Does that review
empty the Florida appellate process "of virtually all legal
consequence,,?I63
As a matter of judicial administration, perhaps schemes creating
160. Bush, 531 U.S. at 118 (Rehnquist, C.]., concurring).
161. For Supreme Court decisions discussing these schemes, see Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
162. See supra p. 972-73.
163. Richard Epstein is thus mistaken when he asserts that "[ilt makes no
sense to read the statute as though the contest phase is wholly unconnected with
anything that went on at the protest stage. If so, then there is no need to bother
to wait until the protest is over for the contest to begin." Epstein, supra note 117,
at 630. As Epstein must surely know, the law sometimes requires parties to
exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking legal relief, even in
circumstances where judges are permitted to disregard the administrative
fmdings. As noted in the text, resort to administrative remedies may avoid the
necessity of litigation by providing the relief that a party seeks or by convincing
a party that litigation will be fruidess. Even if judges decide the question de
novo, they may make use of fact finding accomplished during the administrative
proceeding, or they may, in their discretion, choose to defer to administrative
legal determinations.
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duplicative procedures are foolish, but they cenainly are not
absurd. Even though a pany has the right to challenge the initial
determination, she may choose not to exercise that right,
particularly if the facts and arguments developed during the initial
determination bring home the reality that success is unlikely. And
if the losing party does challenge the determination, work done
during the initial phase may assist the factfinder in the later phase.
For example, in this very case, the Florida Supreme Coun was able
to utilize some recount results reached during the protest phase. l64
Moreover, unlike the double trial procedures described above and
ordinary appellate review, a litigant does not have an automatic
right to utilize the contest procedure.165 The statute requires a pany
contesting an election to file a complaint setting fonh one or more
of five grounds for contesting the election, including "[r]eceipt of
a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes
sufficient to change orplace in doubt the result o/the election. ,,166 In the
vast majority of elections, no party will be able to make plausible
allegations to this effect. The contest procedure will therefore be
unavailable, and the protest result will be dispositive.
The second problem the Chief Justice discerned related to the
Florida coun's interpretation of the term "legal votes.,,167
According to Rehnquist, there was no showing of a "'rejection of
a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the
result of the election,,,168 because votes are "legal" only when voters
have followed posted instructions. 169 When voters fail to follow
these instructions (by, for example, failing to remove hanging chads
from their ballots) and when the ballots are not counted because the
"electronic or electromechanical equipment performs precisely in
164. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla. 2000) (holding that in
contest phase, court can rely upon vote-counting completed during protest
phase).
165. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.118 (West Supp. 2001).
166. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c} (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
167. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,118 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.]., concurring).
168. Id at 117 (Rehnquist, C.]., concurring) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.168(3)(c} (West Supp. 2001».
169.Id at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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the manner designed,,,170 legal votes have not been cast.
Once again, the relevant statutes simply will not bear this
interpretation. Florida law nowhere explicitly defines the term
"legal votes." The Chief Justice derives his definition from the fact
that the statute requires voting machines to be "capable of correctly
counting votes.,,171 But this derivation rests on an obvious non
sequitur. It is, of course, possible that the equipment Florida
utilized met the statutory requirement, but the mere existence of
the requirement does nothing to prove that it was met. The
existence of the requirement does not show that the machines in
fact correctly counted all legal votes or that they "perform[ed]
precisely in the manner designed."I72 Indeed, if the requirement
itself provided such assurance, it is hard to see why Florida law
would provide for manual recounts designed to uncover machine
error.173
Chief Justice Rehnquist states that precincts using punch-card
ballots posted instructions directing voters to make cenain that
they cleanly punched their ballots and removed hanging cha~.174
This statement is demonstrably false. In support of it, he cites to a
dissenting opinion by Judge Tjoflat in an earlier case decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.175 But the very
footnote cited by the Chief Justice makes clear that the quoted
170.Id.
171. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5606(4) (West Supp. 2001).
172. Bush, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
173. Judge Posner makes a similar error in his attack on the Florida Supreme
Court's decision. He writes "[t]he machinery for counting punchcard ballots
which are the form of ballot used in 40 percent of Florida's counties, containing
63 percent of the state's population, was not designed to tabulate dimpled or
otherwise unpunched-through ballots; so how could its failure to count such
ballots be thought an error in tabulation?" Posner, supra note 2, at 726. The
undefended premise behind the reasoning is that a putative defect in the vote
counting machinery could not possibly be a defect if it was sufficiently
widespread.
174. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
175.Seeid. at 109 (citing Touchston v. McDermott, 234F.3d 1133, 1141n.19
(11th Cir. 2000) (Tjoflat, J. dissenting)).
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instructions were not posted in all counties. 176 Moreover, even if
they were, it does not follow that the failure to obey these
instructions (not contained in the statutes themselve:s) makes the
vote "illegal." On the contrary, the statutory scheme makes clear
that voter intent, rather than voter error, is the touchstone for
determining whether and how to count a ballot. Thus, section
101.5614(5) provides that "[nJo vote shall be declared invalid or
void if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as
determined by the canvassing board. ,,177 The ChiefJustice dismissed
this provision as "entirely irrelevant,,178 apparently 'because it is
contained within a section dealing with "damaged or defective"179
ballots. He seems to have assumed that the section concerns only
ballots that are "damaged or defective" for reasons other than voter
error. But the section itself states explicitly that it applies to any
ballot that" cannot properly be counted by the automatic tabulating
equipment."180 Moreover, the section clearly contemplates voter
error. Thus, section 101.5614(6) provides that "[iJf an elector marks
more names than there are persons to be elected to an office or if it
is impossible to determine the elector's choice, the el~!ctor's ballot
shall not be counted for that office. ,,181 The clear implication of this
language is that if there are voter errors other than marking more
names than there are persons to be elected and if it is possible to
determine the elector's choice, the ballot shall be counted.
176. The footnote reads as follows:
Instructions to voters in Palm Beach County, a county that uses punch
card technology, read: "After voting, check your ballot card to be sure
your voting sections are clearly and cleanly punched and th.ere are no
chips left hanging on the back of the card." The instructions ill Broward
County, also a punch card county, read: "To vote, hold the stylus
vertically. Punch the stylus straight down through the ballot card for
the candidates or issues of your choice. "
Touchston v. McDermott, 234F.3d 1133,1141 n.19 (11th Cir. 2000) (fjoflat,J.,
dissenting).
177. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West Supp. 2001).
178. Bush, 531 U.S. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.}., concurring).
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West Supp. 2001).

180.Id.
181. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(6) (West Supp. 2001).
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Finally, even if the Chief Justice is correct and this section is
irrelevant, the statutory recount procedure, which plainly is
relevant, makes clear that the legislature meant to utilize a voter
intent criterion. Section 102.166(7)(b) provides that "[i]f a counting
team is unable to determine a voter's intent in casting a ballot, the
ballot shall be presented to the county canvassing board for it to
determine the voter's intent. ,,182 Why bother with such a referral if
the only appropriate question is whether a voter marked the ballot
in a fashion that could be read by the machine?l83
The Chief Justice chastises the Florida Court for ignoring the
Secretary of State's contrary opinion because, he claims, the
Secretary "is authorized by law to issue binding interpretations of
the Election Code.,,184 At very best, this claim is misleading. In
support of it, the Chief Justice cites sections 97.012 and 106.23 of
the Florida code. But section 97.012, which contains a long list of
the Secretary of State's duties. says not one word about her
authority to issue binding opinions. ISS Section 106.23 does speak of
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(7}(b) (West. Supp. 2001).
183. See McConnell, supra note 2, at 664.
184. Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 98.119 (2000) (Rehnquist. C.J., concurring).
185. The section reads, in its entirety, as follows:
The Secretary of State is the chief election officer of the state, and it is
his or her responsibility to:
(1) Obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation,
and interpretation of the election laws.
(2) Provide uniform standards for the proper and equitable
implementation of the registration laws.
(3) Actively seek out and collect the data and statistics necessary to
knowledgeably scrutinize the effectiveness of election laws.
(4) Provide technical assistance to the supervisors of elections on
voter education and election personnel training services.
(5) Provide technical assistance to the supervisors of elections on
voting systems.
(6) Provide voter education assistance to the public.
(7) Coordinate the state's responsibilities under the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993.
(8) Provide training to all affected state agencies on the necessary
procedures for proper implementation of this chapter.
(9) Ensure that all registration applications and forms prescribed or
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binding opinions, but makes clear that the opinions are binding
only on the person who seeks the opinion or with reference to
whom the opinion is sought. 186 It nowhere states that the Florida
Supreme Court must accept the opinion. l87 ChiefJustice Rehnquist
cites Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Committee188 for the
proposition that "[t]he Florida Supreme Court ... must defer to the
Secretary's interpretations. "189 This citation is remarkable. On the
very page to which the Chief Justice refers, the Krivanek court
specifically states that although such interpretations are "persuasive
authority and, if ... reasonable •.. are entitled to great weight"190
they are "not binding judicial precedent. "191 Just who, one must ask,
is guilty of distorting Florida law?

approved by the department are in compliance with the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.
(10) Coordinate with the United States Department of Defense so
that armed forces recruitment offices administer voter registration in a
manner consistent with the procedures set forth in this code for voter
registration agencies.
(11) Create' and maintain a central voter file.
(12) Maintain a voter fraud hotline and provide election fraud
education to the public
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.012 (West Supp. 2001).
186. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.23 (West Supp. 2001).
187. The statute authorizes the Division of Elections to provide advisory
opinions when requested by various persons. It then states:
Any such person or organization, acting in good faith upon such an
advisory opinion, shall not be subject to any criminal penalty provided
for in this chapter. The opinion, until amended or revoked, shall be
binding on any person or organization who sought the opinion or with
reference to whom the opinion was sought, unless material facts were
omitted or misstated in the request for the advisory opinion.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.23 (West Supp. 2001).
188. 625 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1993).
189. Bush, 531 U.S. at 119-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
190. Krivanek, 625 So. 2d at 844.
191. Id
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ill. THE DEEP POLITICS OF BUSH v. GORE

I hope I have said enough to demonstrate that the majority and
concurring opinions in Bush v. Gore should not be taken seriously.
Why, then, did the Court reach the conclusion that it did? The
most obvious explanation is that the Court acted from narrowly
partisan motives. An extreme version of this theory holds that the
Court set out to make George Bush the President come what may,
and that it simply did what needed to be done in order to
accomplish this goal. A slightly less extreme version holds that the
justices' political bias caused them to view the Florida court
decisions that disadvantaged Bush with profound and unjustified
suspicion. Determined to fight fire with fire, they adopted a
partisan stance of their own so as to counteract what they honestly,
but erroneously, thought were outrageous decisions.
There is no way to disprove these hypotheses, and there is some
evidence supporting them. After all, if the Court had more
defensible reasons for the outcome it reached, why did it fail to
present them in its opinions? Nonetheless, I believe that it is worth
exploring more respectable, if unarticulated, arguments that
support the Court's decision. If these arguments in fact motivated
the Justices, they save the Court from the charge of overt
partisanship. Unfortunately, however, they also lead to troubling
contradictions that reach far beyond this particular case. In short,
they help us to see what really is bad-not just about Bush v. Gore,
but also about the Court's approach to constitutional adjudication
more generally.

A. In Partial Defense ofa Political Decision
Surprisingly, the best entry into these alternative rationales is
provided by Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion. Justice Ginsburg
reacted strongly to Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion,
where he observed that although federal courts "generally defer to
state courts on the interpretation of state law ... there are ... areas
in which the Constitution requires this Court to undertake an
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independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law.,,·192
In support of this proposition, the Chief Justice cited NAA CP
v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson,193 and Bouie v. City ofColl1!mbia. 194 The
first case grew out of a concerted and outrageous effort by Alabama
officials to drive the NAACP from the state. 195 After a state conn
enjoined the NAACP from functioning, Alabama .1ttempted to
argue that a putative procedural error by the NAACP deprived the
United States Supreme Court of jurisdiction to review the
judgment.196 The Supreme Court held that the state's interpretation
of its own laws was so novel that the NAACP could not be bound
by it. 197
The second case, Bouie, dealt with criminal convic:tions against
sit-in demonstrators who were protesting racial segregation in the
South. 198 The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that
a state court had impermissibly broadened the scope of its own
trespass statute beyond what a fair reading provided. 199
Justice Ginsburg reacted to the Chief Just:ice's "casual
citation,,2°O of these cases with something close to cold fury. Bouie
and Patterson she argued, were "embedded in historical contexts
hardly comparable to the situation here.,,20l Patterson was "a case
decided three months after Cooper v. Aaron, . • . ill the face of
Southern resistance to the civil rights movement. ,,202 Bouie, too, was
decided "at the height of the civil rights movement.,,20J The Florida
Supreme Court, she insisted, "surely should not be bracketed with

192. Bush, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
193.357 U.S. 449 (1958).
194.378 U.S. 347 (1964).
195. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 451.
196. See id. at 454-58.
197. See id. at 457-58.
198. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 348-49.
199.Id. at 362-63.
200. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202.Id.
203.Id.
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state high courts of the Jim Crow South. ,,204
Justice Ginsburg is right to claim. that these cases must be read
in their historical context.20S Patterson was one of several cases that
reached the Court in the 1950's and 1960's involving a variety of
tactics designed to destroy the NAACP. 206 The result in Patterson
itself is unexceptional; the grounds on which Alabama attempted
to block the NAACP's appeal were obviously pretextual.
Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that in this and other cases
involving the NAACP, the Court understood that much more was
at stake than the particular legal issues formally presented.207 The
Court saw the cases against the broader backdrop of resistance to its
still recent decision in Brown v. Board o/Education. 208 For example,
when Justice Clark indicated that he would dissent in one of the
cases, Justice Frankfurter warned him against "'a break in the
unanimity of the Court in what is, after all, part of the whole
segregation controversy. The sky is none too bright anyhow. The
mere fact that you are dissenting would be blown up out of all
proportion to what you yourself would subscribe to.,,,209

204.Id. at 141.
205. Later in the Term, the Court itself provided some support for her
assertion with regard to Bouie. In a case far removed from the racial strife of the
1960's, it disavowed some of Bouie's dicta. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 457,
457-58 (2001).
206. For an account, see MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CML RIGHTS LAW:
THURGOOD MARsHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 283-300
(1994).
207. As Michael Klarman, perhaps the leading legal historian of race law in
America, puts the point:
It is inconceivable that the Justices' view of the case-both on the merits and
on the alleged state procedural default-was uninfluenced by their
knowledge that the state of Alabama, including its jurists, were engaged in
a project of massive resistance to Brown v. BoardofEducation, a fundamental
part of which involved shutting down the NAACP's operations in the state.
Klarman, supra note 3, at 1738.
208. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"
209. BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHAN LEsHER, INSIDE THE WARREN
COURT 159 (1983) (quoting Frankfurter's writing to Clark).
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Ultimately, Clark was persuaded to withdraw his dissent. 210
Similarly, Bouie was one of a large number of cases reaching the
Court involving the eruption of sit-in demonstrations against
Southern segregation.211 As David Currie observes, the criminal
convictions of the demonstrators led the Court into "a long series
of guerrilla skirmishes to prevent [their] punishment. ,,212 The Court
"found one excuse after another,,213 to reverse all the convictions on
a wide variety of theories of varying plausibility.214 As a
contemporary critic complained, "It would be helpful if these and
other similar cases could be labeled 'good for use ill sit-in cases
only.",215 There is no doubt that at least some members of the
Court understood that a decision upholding the convictions might
have an adverse impact on the Civil Rights Bill then pending in
Congress and were motivated in part by the desire not to derail the
legislation.216 When the Court seemed on the verge of affirming one
210. See id.
211. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE Sm'REME COURT:
THE SECOND CENTURY, 1886-1986, at 383 (1990).
212.Id.
213. Id. at 422.
214. For contemporary accounts of the Court's frantic attempt to find
plausible grounds for reversal in each of the cases, see Monrad G. Paulsen, The
Sit·in Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 137;
Thomas P. Lewis, The Sit in Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SUP. CT. REv. 101.
215. Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and EqUltl in Title to the
Legislative and Executive Branches of Government, 78 HARV. L. REv. 143, 162
(1964).
216. For example, according to Del Dickson, Justice Goldberg made the
following statement to the conference:
[I]f we allow public discrimination in public places, I am convinced that
we will set back legislation indefinitely. . . . It would be a great
disservice to the nation to decide this issue 5-4. There is legislation
pending. The federal government's argument is not implausible. Rather
than handing down a 5-4 decision Black's way [afflJ:ming the
convictions], I think that it is better to put these cases off on t he ground
urged by the United States, reversing them narrowly and not reaching
the broad ground.
Conference of October 26, 1963, in THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE
(1940-1985) 721, 722-23 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
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of the convictions, in Bell v. Maryland, 217Justice Brennan circulated
a draft dissent, observing that "[w]e of this Court ... are not so
removed from the world around us that we can ignore the current
debate over the constitutionality of [the Civil Rights Act] if enacted
[and that] we cannot be blind to the fact that to day's opposing
opinions ... will inevitably enter into and perhaps confuse that
debate. ,,218
Lucas A. Powe, one of the most astute observers ofthe Warren
Court, details what happened next:
Uustice Brennan] searched for a vote to flip the result....
[H]e concocted a reason to avoid the merits. He argued that
the case should be sent back to the Maryland courts for
them to consider the effect of a Baltimore ordinance and a
state law each prohibiting discrimination in Baltimore
restaurants. Both laws had been adopted after the Maryland
court of appeals had affirmed Bell's conviction....
Normally an intervening state law, at best, would cause the
Court to vacate rather than reverse convictions, but
Brennan wanted a reversal, and he convinced Clark ... 'to
desert.' •.•
Brennan had won because he had refused to lose; Bell did
not derail Congress; and sit-ins as a legal issue was behind
the Court because henceforth there was a federal statutory
prohibition against discrimination in places of public
accommodation.219
There is a sense, then, in which Justice Ginsburg is on target when

217. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
218. BERNARDSCHWARTZ, THEUNPUBIlSHEDOPINIONSOFTHEWARREN
COURT 187 (1985).
219. LUCASA.POWE,]R., THEWARRENCOURT ANDAMEruCANPOLITICS
229 (2000).
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she says that these cases must be read in context.220 But there is a
more important sense in which the cases undercut her position. The
cases show that at least some members of the Warren Court
perceived themselves as bending ordinary principles of
constitutional law when doing so was necessitated by
countervailing moral and political imperatives.221 Nor were these
the only instances where the Warren Court was guilty of this sin,
if sin it be. The most famous example is Brown I'}. Board of
Education.222 Here is how Powe, a strong defender of the result in
Brown, describes the opinion:
Where, using appropriate legal sources, is there justification
for holding the Equal Protection Clause is violated by
separate but equal? It couldn't be the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment without more-because while the text might
easily be construed to say no discrimination, it would take
some interpretation to move from no discrimin;ation to
treating separate but equal as discrimination.... The next
most likely source of reasoning would be to ask what those
who created and adopted the Fourteenth Amf!ndment
thought they were doing.... [But t]he history didn't show
that [the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to bar
segregation], and attempts to force it to do so would not
persuade....
If ... the history of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
be ignored, then the next best approach would be to rely on
precedent. Since Plessy was obviously the dmnmant
precedent, the Court would have to demonstrate ei1cher that
Plessy was wrong when decided or that subsequent judicial
220. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140-41 (2000) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
221. As Michael Klarman puts it "[T]he only legal principle that Bouie stands
for is that sometimes the Supreme Coun, for political reasons, will decide cases
in a lawless fashion. In one sense, then, though not the one thl~ conservative
Justices intended, Bouie was the perfect case for them to cite in Blish." Klarman,
supra note 2, at 1741.
222. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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developments had undermined its authority. In fact, the
Court's decisions could support both these methods of
attack, yet Warren eschewed both.223
Of course, these criticisms of Brown are controversial.224 But what
really matters is not that some academics find them persuasive. The
important point is that distinguished members of the Court, who
voted for Brown, were also persuaded. At least Justice Jackson and
probably Justice Frankfurter believed that Brown was indefensible
as a matter of constitutional law, but voted for the result anyway
because of their strong belief that an end to legally enforced
segregation was a political and moral imperative.225
223. POWE, supra note 219, at 40-41.
224. For two notable attempts to defend Brown on grounds other than those
offered by the Court, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness ofthe Segregation
Decisions, 69 YALEL.J. 421 (1960); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947 (1995).
225. Jackson was explicit on the point. Here is how Del Dickson recounts
his conference statement when the Court first considered the desegregation cases:
This is a political question. To me personally, this is not a problem. But
it is difficult to make this other than a political decision ....
The problem is to make a judicial basis for a congenial political
conclusion .... As a political decision, I can go along with it-but with
a protest that it is politics.
Conference of December 12, 1954, in The SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE
(1940-1985), supra note 216, at 654, 658. After the case was reargued, and when
it was clear that a majority of the Court would vote to overturn segregation,
Jackson prepared a draft which, according to Mark Tushnet, stated that he
"'simply [could not] fmd in the conventional material of constitutional
interpretation any justification for saying' that segregated education violated the
Fourteenth Amendment," but nonetheless argued that "the erroneous 'factual
assumption' that 'there were differences between the Negro and white races,
viewed as a whole" justified the ending oflegal segregation. rUSHNET, supra note
206, at 212-13. Justice Frankfurter's position was somewhat more ambiguous.
At the initial conference on the desegregation cases, Dickson quotes Frankfurter
as follows:
I have read all of [the history of the Fourteenth Amendment] and I
can't say that it meant to abolish segregation .... I don't see anything
in the United States Code or in the equal protection clause on the basis
of which such a decision could be made ....
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Thus, when Justice Ginsburg uses Warren Court jurisprudence
to attack the Bush majority for mixing politics with law, she is
playing with fire. The Warren Court regularly mixed law with
politics, and the Justices who served almost a half century ago
would surely have understood, even if they might not h;ave publicly
admitted, that there are times when law must be subservient to
politics. Although some academics purport to be shocked - shocked
- by this assertion, it should surprise no one. Even when legal
[I] can't say that it is unconstitutional to treat a Negro differently
than a white, but I would put all of these cases down for reargument.
Conference of December 13, 1952, in The SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE
(1940-1985), supra note 216, at 646,651. It is possible, of course, that for these
reasons Frankfurter would have voted to uphold segregation at this point, but
changed his mind after reargument. But this hypothesis ignores Frankfurter's
own assertion that he was prepared to strike down legal segregation after the first
argument. See TU5HNET, supra note 206, at 194 (quoting letter from Frankfurter
to Reed written three days after Brown was decided, stating "that if the cases had
been decided during the 1952 Term, 'there would hav(~ been four
dissenters-Vmson, Reed, Jackson and Clark'" Frankfurter pushed for
reargument in Brown "for fear that the case would be decided 1he other way
under Vinson.") Moreover, it is doubtful that anything happened between the
first argument and the ultimate decision to change his mind. See Michael J.
Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It M'ltter, 83 GEO.
L.J. 433, 437 (1994) (expressing doubt that the focus on remedy or new research
on original understanding of Fourteenth Amendment changed Frankfurter's
views).
Finally, there is some evidence that, even on the eve of the Court's decision
in Brown, Frankfurter was still expressing the view that the decu:ion could not
be justified on constitutional grounds. According to Justice Douglas' conference
notes, at the conference on December 12, 1953, Frankfurter said the following:
As a pure matter of history, in 1867, the Fourteenth Amendment did
not have as its purpose to abolish segregation. The due process and equal
protection clauses certainly did not abolish segregation when the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The most that the history shows
is that the matter was inconclusive. A host of legislation :?assed by
Congress presupposes that segregation is valid. A host of legis lation and
history in Congress and in this Court indicates that Plessy was right.
Conference of December 12, 1952 in THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE
(1940-1985), supra note 216, at 657. But cf. TU5HNET, supra note 206, at 211
(questioning whether Douglas quoted Frankfurter correctly).
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principles are completely determinate, before one enforces them
there is always an anterior question about whether one ought to do
so. Law does not establish its own morality, and, although we
would sometimes like to deny it, we always have the option to play
the game by different rules. What else could Justice Jackson have
meant when, in one of the most famous and revered Supreme
Court opinions ever written, he stated that sometimes the result in
a constitutional case should "depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories
of law,,?226 Indeed, what else could Justice Scalia have meant when
he confessed to being a "faint-heaned originalist"W and admitted
that he could not "imagine [him]sel£, ,any more than any other
federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of
flogging" even if there were no constitutional warrant for striking
it down?228
Of course, the fact that there may be political reasons
supponing the result in Bush v. Gore does not mean that there are
good political reasons. Apan from raw panisanship, what nonlegal
reasons might support the outcome? I can think of three
interlocking arguments, each rooted in contemporary conservative
thought, and each with some plausibility.
First, there is the argument from formalism. Formalism
emphasizes the virtue of rule-following, especially when the rules
provide closure for a dispute that might otherwise go on
indefinitely.229 Some liberal perfectionists want to root out every
injustice by ignoring the rules whenever they fail to produce just
outcomes. Conservatives appropriately remind us that traveling
down this road risks chaos. This is true in pan because even bad
226. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
aackson, J., concurring).
227. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849,
864 (1989).
228.Id.
229. For defenses of this position, seeFREDERICKF. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION
MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE (1991); Larry Alexander, "WithMe,It'sAllerNuthin":
Formalism in LawandMorality, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 530 (1999).
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rules provide predictability, efficiency, and order. It is true as well
because, in the absence of rules, individual discretion leads
inevitably to abuse.230
Thus, many conservatives favor contraction of habeas corpus
rights for convicted prisoners because they understand that endless
review will never wring out all errors from the criminal justice
system and may introduce new ones.231 At some point the process
must come to an end, especially in cases where the defendant has
had a fair chance to raise his claims and has failed to do so because
of inattention to the rules.
Similarly, they oppose statistical readjustments of raw census
data because even an arbitrary process is better than one that can be
manipulated for political purposes.232 Perhaps statistical
readjustmc;:nts would lead to a marginal improvement r.n accuracy,
but once we allow any departure from the textually specified
process, we run the risk of politically motivated departures. 233
And so, too, they opposed recounts in Florida be,:ause, in an
230. I do not mean to suggest that liberals never see the virtues of formalism.
Under the right conditions, liberals can be formalistic as well. For example, an
earlier generation of liberals often defended free speech and fourth amendment
rights by relying on formalism. For a discussion of the indeterminate political
valence of formalism, see Kathleen M. Sullivan,Foreword: TheJustu:es ofRulesand
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22 (1992). Still, in our present political culture,
worries about the evils of unchecked discretion that might exist if rules could be
ignored seem more associated with conservative thought.
231. For the classic statement of this position, see Paul M. Bator, Finality in
CriminalLawandFederalHabeasCorpusforStatePrisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441
(1963).
232. See, e.g., L. Lynn Hogue, One for the Constitution: Censl'1S Move Right
Under Law, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at A17 (quoting then Secretary of
Commerce Robert Mosbacher as rejecting statistical adjustment ofcensus because
of "overriding concerns" about the "slippery slope" problem and the "potential
for partisan manipulation").
233. It is not obvious why statistical adjustments, a fairly mechanical
process, should be thought more susceptible to manipulation than in-person
efforts, which inevitably involve some discretion. Still, I take consc:rvatives to be
expressing a good-faith concern when they complain that once we depart from
the seemingly bright-line requirement of an "actual enumeration," the risks of
discretionary political decisions is unacceptable.
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election as close as this one, we could recount endlessly without
ever removing all doubt,234 because the quixotic effort to do so is
bound to introduce more doubt than it removes,235 and because
such an effort is open to abuse and political manipulation.236 The
televised pictures of politically appointed election officials holding
individual ballots to the light perfectly captured these concerns.
These worries, in tum, overlap with a second strand of
conservative thought-the argument for personal responsibility.
Once the rules are in place, on this view, people who fare poorly
have no one to blame but themselves. This position is reflected in
the defense of "meritocracy,,,237 in the resistance of" effects" tests in
equal protection jurisprudence,238 and in opposition to affirmative
action239 and, more generally, to most forms of redistribution. 240 H
formalism reflects the view that even bad rules are better than no
234. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 2 (arguing that "the presidential election
of 2000 was a tie" and that "[i]n politics, as in all walks of life, it is sometimes
necessary to have rules for breaking ties").
235. See, e.g., Andrew Ferguson, Who Are You CallingAngry?, TIME, Dec.
18, 2000 ("Count the totals 10 times, and you will get 10 different results-first
one winner, then another, and then the first one again.").
236. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 2, at 662-63 (arguing that "[t]he officials
counting dimpled chads . • . knew precisely which candidate would be
advantaged ... [and] changed standards until they found the one that would
produce the desired results" and that therefore there was a "federal interest in
ensuring that state executive and judicial branches adhered to the rules for
selecting electors established by the legislature, and do not use their interpretive
and enforcement powers to change the rules after the fact").
237. Of course, conservatives are not alone in defending meritocracy. See,
e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique ofMerit AntiSemitic?, 83 CAL. L. REv. 853 (1995).
238. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Cf. Larry
Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 149,213 (1992)(arguingthat the fact
that one is the victim of prior discrimination does not justify overlooking
relevant traits when seeking best person to do job).
239. See, e.g., Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative A ction, 34 WM.
& MARy L. REv. 33 (1992).
240. Seegenerally RICHARDA. EPSTEIN, T AKINGS:PruvATE PROPERTY AND
TIlE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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rules at all, the personal responsibility argument captures the
intuition that, in any event, the rules are not so bad. The people
who are on top in some sense deserve to be on top. They are, after
all, the ones who played by the rules and won "fair and square."
People who are not on top could be if only they used the same rules
to their advantage. Hence, bending of the rules for the sake of
sentimental liberal conceptions of social justice provides perverse
incentives that reward sloth, a culture of victimization, and interest
group politics.241
This view is also right beneath the surface in Bush v. Gore. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out, the rules for marking ballots
were prominently posted.242 What he did not say, but might have,
is that anyone not intelligent enough to be able to follow these
simple directives is also not intelligent enough to vote
responsibly.243 Perhaps these people should not he formally
disfranchised, but neither should we distort the system to
accommodate them. Hence, people who mismarked thdr ballots or
left hanging chads, hardly deserve our sympathy, much less the
dismantling of the entire system to meet their needs.
Finally, both these concerns are linked to a third conservative
position-the argument from judicial supremacy. It m::~y seem odd
241. See, e.g., CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL
POllCY, 1950-1980 (1984).
242. As noted above, however, he apparently exaggerated the extent to
which this was true. See supra pp. 1001-02.
243. This view is reflected in Justice O'Connor's evident ann.oyance when
counsel for Vice President Gore attempted to explain the mistakes that voters
had made:
MR. BOIES: Another, another thing that they counted was he said they
discerned what voters sometimes did was instead of properly putting
the ballot in where it was supposed to be, they laid it on top, and then
what you would do is you would fmd the punches went not through
the so-called chad, but through the number.
QUESTION: Well, why isn't the standard the one that voters are
instructed to follow, for goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn't be clearer.
I mean, why don't we go to that standard?
Oral Argument of David Boies at 56-57, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No.
00-949).
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to identify this as a conservative position. At least in the recent
past, conservatives have attempted to assume the mantle of judicial
restraint. 244 Even now, conservatives have appropriated the rhetoric
of judicial restraint, but if one looks to actions rather than words,
Rehnquist Court decisions are better explained by an older
conservative tradition that sees courts as the primary bulwark
against the unprincipled disorder that is the hallmark of the
political process. According to this older view, democratic politics
is the locus for the unprincipled exercise of power. Courts, in
contrast, enforce the rules that protect individuals from
government encroachment. This attitude is reflected in current
conservative enthusiasm for judicial protection of property rights,245
the equal protection rights of white men,246 and free speech
rights. 247 It has become especially salient in the Court's new
federalism jurisprudence, which has totally abandoned the practice
of judicial deference towards congressional judgments and replaced
it with pervasive disdain for political outcomes.248
Notwithstanding the Court's transparently disingenuous claim
that it was forced into the dispute, the assertion of judicial
supremacy is also at the heart of Bush v. Gore. The Court might
have allowed the political process to run its course. We can only
speculate why it chose not to do so, but one reason may have been
the same concerns that explain its intervention elsewhere. Any
political resolution of the 2000 election would have been
disorderly, protracted, and unprincipled. Far better, the justices
244. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POllTICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
245. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 503 U.S. 1003 (1992); NoHan v. California Coastal
Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825 {1987}.
246. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
247. See, e.g.) Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
248. See, e.g.) Board of Trustees ofUniv. of Alabama v. Garret, 531 U.S. 356
(2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boeme v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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might have thought, to resolve the matter cleanly through legal
processes that are governed by reason rather than power.249
Are these good reasons that justify the result that the Court
reached? I certainly don't think so, but I must admit that my views
about them reflect no more than my own political commitments.
I have tried to be concise in setting forth these reasons, and I worry
that I may have presented caricatured versions of them. Let me be
clear, then, that I do not mean to be dismissive. Although I believe
these arguments to be seriously flawed, they are not outside the
bounds of rational discourse. They reflect a widely held set of views
defended by sensible people who are neither monsters nor lunatics.
That is, after all, about the most that we can expect opponents of
the Warren Court to concede about the political judgments that
motivated it. As a (sometime) defender of the Warren Court, it ill
behooves me to insist on higher standards for the Rehnquist Court.
Thus if we are looking for an apolitical answer to our question
"what's so bad about Bush v. Gore," it cannot be that the decision
was motivated by these reasons, anymore than it m;ikes sense to
claim that the decision is wrong because it led to ::l Republican
administration. From a particular political perspective, the case
seems wrongly decided, but from a different political perspective,
which cannot be dismissed out of hand, the result is eminently
sensible.
Still, it might be claimed that what's bad about Bush v. Gore is
not the reasons themselves, but the Court's disingenuousness about
its reasons. H the Justices really were motivated by a set of
defensible concerns, why did they fail to articulate them? The
answer, I think, is that a candid assertion of these r(:asons in the
context of Bush v. Gore would have laid bare a contra.diction.
Formalism, personal responsibility, and judicial supremacy are
all efforts to make sense of the Official Story. They aU express the
ideal of an apolitical settlement of the questions that c~vide us. But
the Official Story cannot, in tum make sense of Bush v. Gore. The
249. Cj Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 695,
697 (2001) (characterizing the dispute between the justices in terms of "whether
democracy means order and structure or chaos and tumult").
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problem is that in the name of formal rule-following, the Court
itself broke the rules. As I have argued above, the Court's decision
is simply indefensible in terms of the standard rules of
constitutional interpretation. A commitment to formal rulefollowing therefore cannot justify the outcome. Moreover, if the
rules were broken, then it cannot be, as the personal responsibility
argument claims, that people who obeyed the rules deserved what
they got. And since the argument from judicial supremacy rests on
the supposed willingness of courts to obey the rules, this position
collapses as well. Put differently, the most plausible defense of Bush
v. Gore is that the Court appropriately relied upon political, rather
than legal judgments. But this defense will not work if, as I believe,
the political judgments were, themselves, grounded in assertions
about the importance of legality. What's bad about Bush v. Gore,
then, is not that the decision is either "law" or "politics," but that
the Court tried to have it both ways. The political judgments
providing best defense of the decision argue for the exclusion of
political judgments.

B. Toward an Unsettled Constitution
The only way out of this contradiction is to abandon the
Official Story. Recall that standard constitutionalism rests on the
assumption that there is a single agreement or settlement on the
metalevel and that courts are able to reason from this agreement to
settle disagreements on the ordinary, political level. Because the
Court embraced this assumption, it was led to the logical
contradictions set out above. Bush v. Gore demonstrates that the
Official Story cannot work because disagreements on the metalevel
replicate disagreements on the political level. To be sure, if
everyone agreed on a particular constitutional methodology-say,
some version of nonpolitical, constitutional originalism-and ifthis
sort of originalism led to determinate outcomes, we might use this
agreement to settle our disputes. But Bush v. Gore demonstrates
that, whatever they claim, not even the justices, much less every
one else, agree on originalism or on any other nonpolitical
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methodology. Whatever the justices said, the result in Bush v. Gore
is explicable only on the basis of plausible, but eminently
contestable, political commitments to formalism, personal
responsibility, and judicial supremacy.
The Court's belief in a settlement theory, in turn, leads to the
disingenuousness that is the least attractive feature of the majority
and concurring opinions. Because the justices believe that they act
legitimately only when they rely on apolitical principles, they have
to pretend that such principles uncontroversially resolve the case.
Because they think that their role is to settle the election, they have
to insist that constitutional morality obligates the losers to accept
their defeat. 25o
But there is an alternative to settlement theory and to the
transparently make-believe world that it generates. The beginning
of wisdom is to accept some obvious truths: of course, the outcome
in Bush v. Gore is political. It is not the merest coincidence that in
this, and countless other cases, Justice Scalia, a conservative
Republican, finds principles congenial to the Republican party
embedded in the Constitution, while Justice Ginsburg, a liberal
Democrat, finds Democratic principles embedded in the same
document. And of course, for this very reason, we c;mnot expect
the Court's decision to settle the argument about the election.
Constitutional law replicates, rather than settles, our disagreements.
One might suppose that the recognition of these facts should
cause the Court to defer to the political branche.s. If judicial
decisions are inevitably political, then why should unelected judges
be involved at all?251 Perhaps they should not be. There is no doubt
that judicial review has some legitimating tendencies, and, there are
disturbing indications that the Court may have succeeded in using
the veneer of legal neutrality to legitimate the outcome of the
election of 2000. Although some celebrate this fact, for reasons
250. C[. Michelman, supra note 5, at 692 (arguing th~lt the Court's
assumption that obedience to its orders "depends on the country's belief that
whatever the Court rules, it rules for reasons of law" might have led it "to act for
reasons other than the very ones it announces.")
251. See Dorf & Issacharoff, supra note 6; Calabresi, supra note 2.
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argued below, I believe that this ability to settle appropriately
contestable .political disputes makes judicial intervention
profoundly problematic.
Still, there are two responses to the seemingly attractive
argument for judicial restraint. First, the argument oversimplifies
the dilemma that the Court faced. Perhaps it would be better, as
Mark Tushnet has recently argued/52 if the Court routinely
remitted important constitutional questions to the political
branches. In a culture where there was a long standing expectation
that courts would rarely or never involve themselves in political
disputes, the possibility of abstention might be meaningful. But, for
better or worse, that is not our culture. In a country like ours,
where judicial review is already a prominent feature of our politics,
deference will seem like only one of several possibilities.
As soon as this is true, the decision to defer is, itself, a kind of
intervention. In a world where judicial intervention is a real option,
a decision to remain passive is, itself, a choice that has politically
predictable consequences and that requires defense. Once the
decision is seen in this way, then the Court is again confronted with
the problem of reasonable political disagreement.
For example, Professor Tushnet makes no secret of the fact that
his opposition to judicial power is linked to a series of substantive
political commitments.253 A person with different political
commitments, or a different view about how favorably a court will
view those commitments, might have a different position about
judicial intervention. Similarly, people with different political
commitments disagreed about whether the 2000 election should be
settled by the political branches. Moreover, even if we restrict our
attention to those who favored such a settlement, these people
were, themselves, divided between those favoring a settlement by
the Florida legislature and those favoring a settlement by the
United States Congress. The meaning of democracy, itself, is
contested in our political culture. Therefore, even a Court
252. See MARKV. TUSHNET, TAKINGTIIECONSTITUTIONAWAYFROMTHE
COURTS (1999).
253. See id. at 129-153.
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committed to respect for democracy would have to decide which
democratic outcome merited respect. The Court had to do
something when confronted with these disagree:ments, and
anything it did, including doing nothing at all, would reflect a
contestable, political judgment.
There is a sense, then, in which judicial power is defensible
simply because it is inevitable, at least in a political culture where
judicial review is already well established. Given this inevitability,
we are forced to confront the question of how to make the best of
what judges do. Here, we come to a second argument for judicial
intervention-an argument that tries to imagine how the use of
judicial power might promote a true community based upon
reasonable consent.
As already noted, the Official Story assumes that such a
community can be fashioned on the basis of a politically neutral
constitutional settlement, which all reasonable people can be .
expected to endorse. Suppose instead we c.onceptualize
constitutional law as a means of unsettling political resolutions.
After all, in a diverse culture where agreement on c()nstitution~l
methodology continues to elude us, constitutional settlements are
inevitably exclusionary. They produce losers whose loss is
experienced as something more than a mere political setback.
Instead, a constitutional loss is said to be rooted in the constitutive
principles of the community. Settlements of this kind are bound to
leave losers nursing serious grievances, and such grievances make
difficult the kind of consent upon which a just community must be
founded.
None of this is to say that we don't require settlements of some
son. No one claims that it would be good for the country for two
people to hold competing inaugural parades on January 20. But
precisely because most of us understand that settlement is good for
the country, we can usually rely on ordinary political processes to
bring it about. The appropriate role for constitutional law is not to
settle disputes, but to systematically unsettle political .outcomes by
providing losers with rhetorical resources that they can utilize to
attack settlements on the one hand while evincing their
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commitment to core community values on the other.
Constitutional rhetoric is both indeterminate, and uniquely
powerful in our culture. This combination allows everyone to use
it to advance their position. Critics of liberal constitutionalism have
long attacked it for this reason, but in fact, the combination of
indeterminacy and power is liberal constitutionalism's greatest
strength. This is so because if we are to expect losers to accept their
loss while remaining within the community, then we need to
provide them with a way of continuing the argument.
Conceptualized in this fashion, constitutional law allows dissenters
to dispute political outcomes from within the community, rather
than attacking it from without.
Thus, judicial intervention is justifiable to the extent that courts
use the rhetoric of liberal constitutionalism in a fashion that opens
up political argument. To be sure, a court that understood
constitutional law in this way would resolve the dispute before it
and would do so utilizing the standard tools of constitutional
argument, including text, tradition, precedent, moral reasoning, and
policy analysis. But it would do so while also candidly
acknowledging that a different court, with different background
political commitments, could use the same tools to reach a different
outcome. Such an acknowledgment would invite losers to
participate in continued dialogue, even as the case is decided against
them. It builds community by acknowledging that the entailments
of even our deepest commitments are appropriately and radically
contestable.
What's bad about Bush v. Gore, then, is that none of the justices
wrote an opinion that remotely approaches these requirements.
Both the majority and the dissenting justices made the mistake of
supposing that the Court's legitimacy stemmed from its ability to
articulate a set of apolitical principles to which all Americans owe
allegiance. The majority thought (or at least pretended to think)
that these principles gave it the right to settle the election, while the
dissent thought that the majority's abuse of the principles
squandered its legitimacy. Both sides are sadly mistaken. The
Supreme Court has no warrant to shut down political disputes.
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Constitutional law best serves the ends of community when it
opens up, rather than closes down, political argument. Nor should
the Supreme Court's prestige depend upon its politic;al neutrality.
Instead, it earns that prestige when it utilizes concepts and a
yocabulary that are sufficiently open-textured to allow the losers,
using the same concepts and vocabulary, to claim that the Court's
decision is wrong.
I wish that the justices understood all of this and stopped
pretending that only their disinterested statesmanship stands
between the country as we know it and a war of all against all. To
the extent that the Court has persuaded the country that this is
true, its decision provides a powerful argument fo:r those who
oppose judicial review.
Suppose, though that we want to make the best, rather than the
worst, of Bush v. Gore. Oddly, the strength of the unsettled
constitution is apparent even when the Court abuses its powers.
The beauty of unsettlement theory is that it works, at least to some
extent, even when the justices are trying to prevent it from
working.
Thus, it remains unclear whether the Court has succeeded in
shutting down debate about the election. True, George Bush is now
the President and many Americans seem eager to move on. But
given the constellation of political forces in Congress and the
Florida legislature (not to mention the results on the ground in
Florida), a Bush presidency was the likely outcome in any event.
Moreover, if unsettlement theory is to work at all, it cannot work
on the level of the individual case. Whenever the Court makes a
decision, there is a sense in which it settles the case before it. H it
functions at all, unsettlement theory, works on a broader canvass.
Often it unsettles entire areas of law, like the appropriate division
between public and private spheres, but it can also function in the
context of more discrete disputes, like the election of 2000. In this
context, it allows losers to continue the war despite losing a battle.
True, there is no prospect of disposing George Bush a:; President in
the same sense that there is a prospect of, say, overruling Roe v.
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Wade.254 Still, when the Supreme Court made George Bush
President, it handed his opponents a set of potent rhetorical tools
that have the potential to make his victory seem illegitimate and so
weaken him politically.255 Because of the Supreme Court, Gore's
defeat has become something more than a mere political setback.
Instead, it can be portrayed as a constitutional outrage. This is so
because liberal constitutionalism has an existence that is
independent of the Supreme Court. The Court has had its say, and
now it is the tum of Bush's opponents to have theirs. They, too,
can invoke the empty claims of constitutional neutrality to attack
the Court and the outcome that it produced.
Moreover, on a broader scale, Bush v. Gore has the potential to
change the Official Story. At least for a time, it is going to be
difficult for most Americans to take seriously the Court's defenders
when they speak with pompous sanctimony about neutral
constitutionalism and the rule of law. Even if nothing else is
accomplished, temporary freedom from pompous sanctimony is no
small benefit. The risk, of course, is that sanctimony will be
replaced by cynicism. But although this outcome is certainly
possible, it is not inevitable. Instead of bemoaning the politicization
of constitutional law, we might come to celebrate the open texture
of a set of commitments that allows people motivated by
contradictory and irreconcilable substantive views to speak a
common language. Indeed, perhaps even the justices themselves will
come to see that they can be authoritative without being
authoritarian and that the best version of judicial review promotes,
rather than settles, political argument.
Is this optimism warranted? An unsettled constitution provides
tools that political actors can utilize, but it provides no guarantee
of success. Perhaps in the long run the Court's decision will be seen
as wise and the Bush administration as wholly legitimate. Perhaps
the Court will manage to hold onto its Olympian position as the
neutral expositor of supreme law. But there are also other
254.410 U.S. 113 (1973).
255. I make no claim here as to how effective his opponents have been in
using those tools.
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possibilities. It is important that, within days of the Court's
decision, the "Reelect Gore" bumper stickers began to appear, that
within weeks, newly energized interest groups began attempting to
guarantee access to the ballot and preparing for the m~xt Supreme
Court confirmation fight, and that within months the Senate began
hearings on the appropriate consideration of ideology in the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices.
So what's so bad about Bush v. Gore? Just maybe it'!; not so bad,
after all. Even as the Court settled the election, it provided tools
that we can use to unsettle the country. It remains to be seen
whether we will seize this opportunity, but for those of us who
were defeated in the disputed election of 2000, things surely could
have been worse.
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